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Sir Francis Bacon’s most famous and oft quoted aphorism dates back to 
publication in a chapter called Of Heresies in his book Meditationes Sacrae (Sacred 
Meditations) published 1597. While not the first to realize this universal truth, he 
nonetheless is attributed with encapsulating the crux of social dominance with just these 
simple words which were added into his essay in parenthesis, almost as an afterthought 
—“… for knowledge itself is a power...” (Bacon, 1597, M5). Truncated by many through 
the ages and taken out of the religious context in which it had been written, this phrase 
has popularly come to be known simply as: knowledge is power. Few historic examples 
can compare to the lengths by which this phrase has been demonstrated than that 
observed through the manipulation of code, via the supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) targeting computer worm coined STUXNET in June 2010. 
Although essentially degrading the nuclear enrichment program of a nation-state, more 
importantly this event solidified the reality that the cyber domain is operational and can 
have very real effects on the physical world, while retaining a measure of anonymity and 
without necessarily placing military combat units on foreign soil. This physically 
destructive demonstration, once made globally known by Iran, encapsulated and 
epitomized the fears of many self-aware nation-states around the globe as they 
internalized the security vulnerabilities inherent in an interconnected and globally driven 
economy. These fears and concerns are not exclusively an external problem; the United 
States (U.S.) has been aware of this vulnerability and attempting to mitigate it for 
decades. 
Increasing computer interconnectivity, such as the growth of the Internet, 
has revolutionized the way our government, our nation, and much of the 
world communicate and conduct business. However, this widespread 
interconnectivity poses significant risks to the government’s and the 
nation’s computer systems, and to the critical infrastructures they support. 
These critical infrastructures include systems and assets—both physical 
and virtual—that are essential to the nation’s security, economic 
prosperity, and public health, such as financial institutions, 
telecommunications networks, and energy production and transmission 
facilities. (GAO-11–865T, 2011, p. 1) 
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As early as July 1995, a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate predicted future 
terrorist attacks against the U.S. and specified that the White House, the Capitol, symbols 
of capitalism (e.g., Wall Street), critical infrastructure (e.g., power grids, water 
distribution), areas where people congregate (e.g., sports arenas, malls), and civil aviation 
were generally considered suitable targets of vulnerability (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 341). 
A. SCOPE OF WORK 
It has long been the policy of the United States to assure the continuity and 
viability of critical infrastructures. I intend that the United States will take 
all necessary measures to swiftly eliminate any significant vulnerability to 
both physical and cyber attacks on our critical infrastructures, including 
especially our cyber systems. (Presidential Decision Directive 63, 1998, 
para. II) 
This thesis is solely intended to document the ongoing U.S. national strategy 
evolution and implementation with respect to national protection of the cyber integrated 
critical infrastructure (CI) and key resources (KR). Specifically, this thesis focuses on 
reviewing and documenting the history, authorities and responsibilities aligned at the 
national level with regard to defense of the nation against a cyber-threat to national 
CI/KR.  
While primarily focusing on Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
Department of Defense (DoD), it will also explore and identify additional agencies with 
active mandates or roles in cyber defense of the nation. When a holistic view has been 
established, and gaps have been identified, recommendations to bridge the gaps are made. 
This thesis concludes with a viable, although not necessarily palatable, recommendation 
for restructuring authorities and responsibilities in order to best mitigate attacks from 
antagonists utilizing a cyber-strategy and identifying the organization or agency best 
suited to be the federal lead in protecting cyber systems integrated with CI. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
“The capability to do harm—particularly through information networks—is real; 
it is growing at an alarming rate; and we have little defense against it” (Critical 
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Foundations, 1997, p. i). The above quote was taken from the a letter written to the U.S. 
President by Robert T. Marsh, Chairman of the President’s Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, when he presented the Commission’s findings in 1997. 
Frustratingly, few can effectively argue that we, as a nation, have adequately met that 
threat as it has grown exponentially. Both U.S. presidents since have struggled with the 
same issue and directed a review, received a report of findings, and issued strategic 
guidance in the form of national policy.  
Defense Secretary Panetta stated that ‘foreign cyber actors are probing 
America’s critical infrastructure networks. They are targeting the 
computer control systems that operate chemical, electricity and water 
plants and those that guide transportation throughout this country. We 
know of specific instances where intruders have successfully gained 
access to these control systems. We also know that they are seeking to 
create advanced tools to attack these systems and cause panic and 
destruction and even the loss of life. (Rogers, 2013) 
In-line with current and future conflict, the National Military Strategy for 
Cyberspace Operations (2006) highlights the increasing complexity of the weapons and 
command and control which is forcing more reliance on operations in cyberspace. 
Domestically, information systems are increasingly used in the control and remote 
monitoring of critical infrastructure (CI), and as such present themselves as attractive 
asymmetric targets to adversaries. This is troublesome since irrespective of the period of 
battle or the designated leader, commanders of any size force entering conflict through 
the ages have always faced the same antagonists of war—space, force, and time. The 
dilemma in our newly emerging cyber-era is that the space dimension is too expansive to 
be clearly defined and thus neither a nation-state nor a singular organization is truly able 
to face/manage cyber threats as an independent entity. 
C. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The global architecture of networks, along with the infinite number of system 
administrators, makes it impossible to isolate a threat within organizationally or 
territorially-defined jurisdictions. As such, this thesis will look at the initial and ongoing 
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domestic efforts to secure national critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) with 
respect to cyberspace. 
Possibly best captured early in the cyber revolution and codified in law, the 
Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 states that the official U.S. policy is that 
“… any physical or virtual disruption of the operation of the critical infrastructures of the 
United States be rare, brief, geographically limited in effect, manageable, and minimally 
detrimental to the economy, human and government services, and national security of the 
United States” (42 U.S.C. 5195c, sect. c(1)). 
This study is intended for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Cyber 
Policy, the DHS, and the DoD U.S. Cyber Command to aid in properly assessing the 
necessity of the realignment of responsibilities between federal organizations, specifically 
between the DHS and the DoD in primary protection of national CI/KR. As such, this 
work is intended to contribute to the strategic level discussion of national cyber policy.  
1. DoD Applicability 
The DoD utilizes national cyber strategy, policy, and intent for fiscal planning, in 
order to properly align increasingly scarce allocated resources in the defense of the 
nation, in accordance with the National Military Strategy. Specifically, incorporation 
efforts by DoD aim to identify necessary structure and liaisons in order to reduce 
response times in crisis situations, ensure continuity of communication, and to increase 
efficiencies in support of national strategic objectives. Thus, by recommending a more 
stream-lined national response structure, with respect to threats emanating from or 
through the cyber domain, this study’s recommendations, if implemented, may directly 
impact the DoD by shortening the national response time to cyber-related threats to 
CI/KR.  
Explicitly, the DoD, via U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), would benefit 
from a more efficient cyber situational awareness of CI/KR structure as it may reduce 
evaluation time required to provide an accurate assessment to the U.S. president. 
Presently, NORTHCOM is tasked via the Unified Command Plan with determining and 
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advising the U.S. president if the nation has met the necessary threshold to be considered 
under attack, and thus an indicator of potential conflict/war, domestically.  
2. U.S. Navy Applicability 
The U.S. Navy Information Dominance Corps (IDC) may directly benefit from 
this work, as the operational lead for evaluating and providing a professional judgment to 
the NORTHCOM Commander, with respect to whether the attack threshold(s) for the 
homeland has been exceeded, is currently a U.S. Navy IDC Flag Officer. Better 
situational awareness of the national cybersecurity environment and posture will better 
enable sound judgments and recommendations by decreasing uncertainty and therefore 
risk. 
3. NPS Applicability 
Though not all inclusive of all material available to date, this thesis compiles 
significant cyber-related documentation into a single source, within the chronological 
timeframes and national intent in which it should be considered. As such, this thesis can 
add to the focused national cyberstrategy and cyber policy discussions necessary in 
applicable degree programs at the Naval Postgraduate School (e.g., Cyber Systems and 
Operations).  
D. LIMITATIONS 
Significant impediments remain as obstacles in a candid discussion on the topic of 
cyber authorities and responsibilities. A few of the impediments are seen as restraints in 
this thesis. These are namely the unclassified discussion of cyber capabilities (as it relates 
across the full spectrum of cyber lines of operation), lack of a nationally accepted and 
implemented lexicon, and political restraints.   
1. Capabilities 
Due to the highly classified nature of the DoD cyber Special Access Programs 
(SAP), little in the way of capabilities will be delved into in an effort to keep the 
propensity of this thesis at the lowest level of classification possible. As such, it will be 
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grossly assumed that DoD, by the very nature of schools, billets, commands, and funding 
has the necessary means to employ and/or build the requisite capabilities needed for 
employing Offensive Cyber Effects Operations (OCEO) in the cyber domain. 
2. Lexicon 
To exacerbate the confusion, as of 2011 in the DoD alone, 16 Joint Publications 
(JP) discuss cyberspace-related topics and 8 mention cyberspace operations; complaints 
were that none contained a sufficient all-encompassing discussion of cyberspace 
operations (GAO Report 11–75, 2011). With the significant emphasis on cyber, DoD 
recognized the need to develop and update cyber-related joint doctrine and debated the 
merits of developing a single cyberspace operations joint doctrine publication in addition 
to updating all existing doctrine (GAO Report 11–75, 2011). As reinforcement, Mulligan 
and Schneider (2011) point out that without a widely accepted doctrine, evaluation of 
proposals for cybersecurity improvement is difficult, and debate about their 
implementation can be neither compelling nor conclusive. As a nascent overture, the 
initial lack of clarity regarding basic terminology was resolved internal to DoD with the 
revision of the JP 1–02 in May 2011, which officially defined cyberspace operations as 
“… the employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve 
military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace.” More recently, in February 2013, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) released the approved JP 3–12 
publication which establishes the definitive cyber lexicon internal to DoD, as 
deconflicted with the Presidential Policy Directive 20 (PPD-20) which was released 
months earlier in November 2012 and introduced new terminology relating to the cyber 
domain (CJCS, 2013; POTUS, 2012). 
U.S. Cyber Command actually went a step further by defining full-spectrum cyber 
operations as the employment of the full-range of cyberspace operations to support 
combatant command operational requirements and the defense of DoD information 
networks, to include Computer Network Defense (CND), Computer Network Attack 
(CNA), and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) (GAO Brief 11–695R, 2011). 
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3. Political Solutions 
Although many nation-states have developed and implemented alternate solutions 
for wrestling with the same issue of national cybersecurity, it is important to note the 
degree of control and public input in those decisions. As a single example, although 
seemingly brilliant in the design to maximize control and access to information from 
certain foreign sites for censorship purposes, the Great Fire Wall that is imposed in 
China is an untenable idea in the U.S. due to our inherent belief in individual freedoms 
and civil rights. Thus, it would be unwise to assume that the U.S. could unilaterally 
impose any strategy or doctrine to address any of the myriad of cyber challenges if it 
relied on similar civil-rights infringing properties, as the two political systems are so 
inherently different. With this acknowledgement, I limit the following work to the realm 
of reality that the U.S. solution must be viable within the current realm of the political 
system and therefore a self-imposed limitation, but one worth noting. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The primary research method used to develop this thesis, providing the basis of 
knowledge and expertise, was a literary review. 
I conducted a literature review of books, publications, U.S. and foreign law and 
policy, journals, Internet articles, and previous graduate and undergraduate research.  
To determine the extent to which the U.S. government has issued updated and 
comprehensive guidance, I also reviewed national homeland defense and civil support 
doctrine, policy, and strategy and other relevant documentation, and met with officials 
from DoD and DHS to discuss the existing departmental guidance and to assist in 
identifying any potential gaps in the guidance that could exist. 
Explicitly, I assessed national-level and DoD homeland defense and civil support 
guidance against emerging issues in discussions with DoD, combatant command, and 




This thesis is organized into the following chapters: 
 Chapter I provides the introduction and overview of the thesis. 
 Chapter II describes the significance of, and reviews, the historical context 
of the U.S. national strategy toward national protection and defense of 
critical infrastructure. 
 Chapter III outlines the current implementation of national strategy in 
place to deal with threats to the national critical infrastructure—unity of 
effort. 
 Chapter IV describes the legal authorities, roles and efforts of the federal 
agencies in the implementation of the current unity of effort strategy. 
There is also a discussion on the various strengths and weaknesses 
associated with each U.S. Code cited. 
 Chapter V identifies the analysis of gaps in national documents, cyber 
authorities, and responsibilities and provides a conclusion. 
 Chapter VI details specific recommendations and future research. 
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II. NATIONAL STRATEGY 
Perhaps the sentiments contained in the following pages, are not yet 
sufficiently fashionable to procure them general favor; a long habit of not 
thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of being right, 
and raises at first a formidable outcry in defence of custom. But the tumult 
soon subsides. Time makes more converts than reason. (Paine, 1776) 
Commanders in any conflict, where an adversary operates, must manipulate the 
time controls over the decision making process to be successful in operations (Joint 
Publication 3–0, 2008). This theory is double-edged: 1) internalizing the goal of  
the seamless Command and Control (C2) process, friendly forces must reduce the 
uncertainty with which commanders must deal to expedite the decision of action; while 
2) obfuscating the certainties and information needed by the opposing force to make 
accurate timely decisions (Coakley, 1991). Although the former is usually implemented 
through the use of unity of command, it is only a viable strategy when that command is 
empowered with the proper authorities to address the responsibilities it has been directed 
to execute. When that precondition is untenable or otherwise unavailable, the strategy of 
leveraging as many specialized and independent entities (with existing authorities) 
working toward a common stated goal may yield the same results. Therefore, it is 
important to note that absolutes should not exist in any direct application of theory since 
there are times where decentralization of authority can actually contribute to 
responsiveness by reducing the distance, whether in time and/or space, between decision 
makers and ongoing operations (Joint Publication 3–0, 2008). Deferring to this alternate 
strategy, and due to the sheer interconnectivity and specializations in each of the already 
legally established federal organizations, early in the cyber revolution the U.S. 
implemented a unity of effort strategy toward cybersecurity. The last three U.S. presidents 
have reaffirmed the decision to use a unity of effort approach which is demonstrated 
through the review of the federal documents in this chapter. Unity of effort is 
synonymous with a phrase commonly captured in Federal documents in the last ten 
years—whole of government approach. This strategy when implemented, regardless of 
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the actual term used, may be possibly sufficient in addressing nascent concerns of the 
fledgling interconnected autonomous systems.  
A. SIGNIFICANCE 
The United States possesses both the world’s strongest military and its 
largest national economy. Those two aspects of our power are mutually 
reinforcing and dependent. They are also increasingly reliant upon certain 
critical infrastructures and upon cyber-based information systems. … 
Because our economy is increasingly reliant upon interdependent and 
cyber-supported infrastructures, non-traditional attacks on our 
infrastructure and information systems may be capable of significantly 
harming both our military power and our economy. (Presidential Decision 
Directive 63, 1998, sect. I) 
The above quote remains valid even 15 years later and represents an ill-addressed 
national priority, which could realistically be the U.S.’ Achilles heel. Almost eleven years 
and three presidential administrations later, U.S. President Barrack H. Obama even 
highlighted, in a speech given May 29, 2009, that the “… cyber threat is one of the most 
serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation” (Obama, 2009). 
The challenge obviously is one of leadership and reviewing or challenging the status quo. 
Therefore, the correct solution to defending our nation’s critical infrastructure and key 
resources (CI/KR) from the cyber threat must begin with understanding what has been 
done to date by those entrusted to provide that protection and defense.  
The U.S. Constitution empowers the Office of the U.S. president with authority 
and the responsibility to defend the nation. In that vein, due to the size and complexity of 
the task, the presidential responsibility has been delegated in many reformative 
documents as new and emerging threats are identified. The most recent of these threats is 
that of a cyber-attack affecting critical national infrastructure and key resources in an 
attempt to disrupt the American way of life.  
1. Authority 
In the propensity of the national security reformative documents released by the 
Executive Branch in the last 40 years, authority of the President in issuance is usually 
cited as being from the following key pieces of legislation:  
  11
(1)  the U.S. Constitution;  
(2)  the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (47 U.S.C. 151);  
(3) the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the Defense Production 
Act of 1950, as amended (50 U.S.C. 2061); 
(4) the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended (50 U.S.C. 2251); and 
(5) the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.); Public Law No. 
93–288, as updated by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act of 1988. 
2. Reform 
To date, much of the previous work on proactive national federal strategy to 
respond to Incidents of National Significance (INS) has been generated by the Executive 
Branch of the U.S. government in the form of various Executive Orders, National 
Security Decision Directives, Presidential Decision Directives, Homeland Security 
Presidential Directives, and Presidential Policy Directives. The key references later 
described in this chapter, spanning about 35 years, were created by multiple 
administrations with differing views and motivations, but naturally evolve from 
addressing general domestic invasion, to recovery from natural disasters, to man-made 
physical attacks, to now man-made cyber-attacks. Despite the shifting focus, what seems 
clear after reviewing the last 20 years’ presidential directives and executive orders (EOs) 
is that all of the efforts seem circular in nature as each new presidential administration:  
(1) identifies a critical vulnerability in the national defense of critical 
infrastructure;  
(2) creates a committee of experts and insiders to research and evaluate issue; 
and  
(3) then implements a personalized version of the unity of effort strategy.  
The remainder of the chapter introduces key definitions, details the historic U.S. 
attempts to protect the national critical infrastructure and key resources, and finishes with 
a discussion of how the U.S. has performed successive strategy assessment cycles with 
respect to addressing cyber vulnerabilities. 
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B. COMMON TERMINOLOGY 
As this thesis focuses on the federal strategy, policy and responsibilities 
surrounding the national protection of U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources 
(CI/KR) as it relates to a specific incident of national significance (INS) as identified by 
national intelligence, it follows that these terms should be defined to allow for contextual 
discussion. 
1. Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
Combined as a generic term, CI/KR essentially refers to assets crucial to national 
security, economic vitality, public health and safety. Multiple agencies have integrated 
the acronym into much of their literature. Although referring to the same sub-set of 
assets, the acronym is often seen both with and without the forward slash. Looking into it 
deeper, there seems to be no connotative difference, just agency or author preference. It is 
important to note that the two sub-terms embody different but not mutually exclusive 
sub-sets of national assets. 
a. Definition 
Although an evolving term in an equally evolving cyber-era, national 
critical infrastructure (CI) is formally reiterated/revalidated as of February 12, 2013 by 
the signature and release of Executive Order No. 13,636. The President of the United 
States (POTUS) defines critical infrastructure as “… systems and assets, whether 
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such 
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic 
security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters” (Executive 
Order No. 13,636, 2013, p. 1). It is important to note that the CI definition presented in 
this EO is taken word for word from a document dated October 26, 2001—the Critical 
Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. §5195c, 2001, para.  1016(e)). This 
specific definition represents a significant deviation from more recent 
terminology/definition as it reverts to the previous definition and avoids specifically 
listing national critical infrastructure sectors, as nearly all subsequent definitions have 
attempted to include. In layman’s terms, the acronym is generally indicative of national 
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power grids; water filtration plants and flow points; symbolic national monuments; 
critical government facilities; telecommunications and transportation systems; and 
chemical facilities. 
For historical perspective and to highlight the struggle to correctly identify 
a definitive list, these earlier lists will be covered in the order by which the federal 
documents using them were released. Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) is one of the 
cornerstones of homeland security. Although Presidential Decision Directive 63 (1998) 
lists eight sectors, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Assets (2003) lists 11 sectors of CI, and the National Response 
Framework Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Support Annex (2008) lists 17 
sectors. Examples of sectors include but are in no way limited to: Water, Power & 
Energy, Information & Telecommunications, Chemical Industry, Transportation, 
Banking & Finance, Defense Industry, Postal & Shipping, Agriculture & Food, Public 
Health, and Emergency Services. The realization that, in a modern age, sectors previously 
under-integrated are now significantly important to the physical, financial, and health 
security of the nation simply highlights the transient nature of what can be deemed 
critical.  
The term key resources (KR) remains more ambiguous and overshadowed 
by the fact that most critical infrastructure is better defined in documents previously 
released (e.g., National Infrastructure Protection Plan). As part of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 and reiterated in both the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (2003) 
and National Infrastructure Protection Plan (2006), KR is described as “… publicly or 
privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy and 
government” (6 U.S.C. §101, 2002, para. 9). 
2. Incidents of National Significance 
The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security is the legal authority by 
which an INS is declared. This decision is made in coordination with other federal 
departments and agencies and is worked in conjunction with state, local, tribal, 
nongovernmental, and private-sector entity efforts. Formal INS designation allows for 
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unity of effort under DHS lead as they initiate actions to prevent, prepare for, respond to, 
and recover from such incident (National Response Plan, 2004). This term and authority 
of designation are not to be confused with the legal authority of the Commander U.S. 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to designate the homeland as being at war. Instead, 
it may be helpful in deconfliction of terms to understand that an INS would likely be the 
prelude to such a NORTHCOM designation.  
a. Definition 
The term INS seems to naturally follow as an evolution to the previous 
term in use by the federal government—national security emergency. Accordingly, the 
term national security emergency was originally introduced in Executive Order No. 
12,656 on November 18, 1988 and was defined as “… any occurrence, including natural 
disaster, military attack, technological emergency, or other emergency, that seriously 
degrades or seriously threatens the national security of the United States” (Executive 
Order No. 12,656, 1988, sect. 101(a)). 
The term incident of national significance as first defined in the National 
Response Plan (2004), includes all presidentially-declared emergencies, major disasters, 
and catastrophes and directly references criteria provided in the Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 5 (para. 4). Therein, INS is formally defined as, “… an actual or 
potential high-impact event that requires a coordinated and effective response by and 
appropriate combination of Federal, State, local, tribal, nongovernmental, and/or private-
sector entities in order to save lives and minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-
term community recovery and mitigation activities” (National Response Plan, 2004, p. 
67). As the principal federal official for domestic incident management, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security declares Incidents of National Significance (in consultation with 
other departments and agencies as appropriate), which primarily include credible threats 
or acts of terrorism, major disasters, and emergencies (National Response Plan, 2004). 
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3. National Intelligence 
National Intelligence initially is a difficult term to define in that it incorporates a 
word which has caused serious discussion and yet remains aloof in widespread lexicon 
acceptance—intelligence.  
In the Studies in Intelligence journal, compiled and published by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Dr. Michael Warner highlighted the disparity when he wrote, 
“In a business as old as recorded history, one would expect to find a sophisticated 
understanding of just what that business is, what it does, and how it works. If the business 
is ‘intelligence,’ however, we search in vain. As historian Walter Laqueur warned us, so 
far no one has succeeded in crafting a theory of intelligence” (Warner, 2007, p. 1). 
Although many have attempted it, and done so in the terms most desirable for their 
specific organization, few have succeeded in doing it in such terms as it remains viable 
across various organizations and agencies with different mandates and missions.  
The DoD definitions often reference intelligence in terms of information of value 
as it pertains to enemy [non-U.S.] forces. So, although useful for combatting efforts of 
external antagonists, it negates a use internal to the U.S., when dealing with threats also 
generated internally. The CIA has a much broader purview and thus it may be that in 
1999 they internalized the realization of domestically induced information may be the 
key to operationalizing information through the reduction of uncertainty. Thus in their 
definition, intelligence “… reduced to its simplest terms … is knowledge and 
foreknowledge of the world around us—the prelude to decision and action” (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 1999, p. vii). 
a. Definition 
In reference to Title 50 of U.S. Code (U.S.C.), as updated by the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the terms national 
intelligence and intelligence related to national security refer to all intelligence, 
regardless of the source from which derived. This designation expressly includes 
information, consistent with any guidance issued by the President, gathered within or 
outside the United States pertaining to multiple U.S. government agencies when the 
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stated information “… involves—(i) threats to the U.S., its people, property, or interests; 
(ii) the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; or (iii) any 
other matter bearing on United States national or homeland security” (50 U.S.C. §401a, 
2004, sect. 5). As a result then, any threat to national CI/KR should be perceived by the 
executive agencies and shared as national intelligence. 
C. THE ROAD TO ADDRESSING U.S. NATIONAL CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBER VULNERABILITIES 
Although the road to addressing U.S. critical infrastructure is a long one, 
chronologically listed below, and broken out under various U.S. presidential 
administrations, are simply a few of the more notable references which must be 
considered in order to understand and/or propose a solution to the issue of properly 
implementing a cybersecurity strategy at the national level. 
1. President James “Jimmy” Carter’s Administration  
During President James “Jimmy” Carter’s administration, 
prompted not by analysis but rather by the partial nuclear meltdown 
of one of the Three Mile Island nuclear reactors in Pennsylvania on 
March 28, 1979, he created, and then consolidated all presidentially 
vested powers for civil disaster response into a single agency for 
federal response to disasters—the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
(Executive Order No. 12,148, 1979, sect. 1). 
a. Executive Order No. 12,127–Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (1979)  
Days after the Three Mile Island accident, on March 31, 1979, Executive 
Order No. 12,127 was released marking a significant implementation of a previously 
approved plan. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978 (43 FR 41943) established the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, but it was Executive Order No. 12,127 which activated 
the plan and therefore set the date of FEMA activation as of April 01, 1979 (Executive 
Order No. 12,127, 1978, sect. 1–106). 
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b. Executive Order No. 12,148–Federal Emergency Management 
(1979)  
Within four months of the Three Mile Island nuclear accident, on July 15, 
1979, with continued significant concern over the lack of a viable national response to 
civil emergencies (a term preceding INS), Executive Order No, 12,148 was signed by 
President Carter. This EO significantly recalled and consolidated additional emergency 
management powers that were originally vested in the presidential authority but since 
delegated to organizations and agencies (e.g., Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, DoD, 
Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Department of Commerce, Federal Preparedness Agency, General 
Services Administration, Office of Science and Technology Policy) (Executive Order No. 
12,148, 1979, sect. 1). This document is vital for two reasons: (1) it sets the precedence 
of significant authority consolidation, due to the concern generated over a single type of 
INS—nuclear and (2) it greatly empowered the primary federal agency still in place 
today responsible for coordinating a federal response to events which overwhelm state, 
tribal and/or local resources—FEMA.   
2. President Ronald W. Reagan’s Administrations  
As it was at the fore-front of the political agenda, following 
the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the threat of nuclear 
weapons use/attack domestically remained high on the national 
agenda as the arms race between the U.S. and Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) ran its course. Central to that agenda 
was the survivability of national command and control through a national protection of 
the telecommunication systems. This concern was unambiguously addressed in a key 
document released during the first term of President Ronald Reagan, but was not the only 
significant document to emerge during his administrations.  
Of historic note, it was also in 1983, during President Reagan’s first 
administration, that the transition of the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network’s 
(ARPANET’s) Network Control Program protocol to that of the TCP/IP protocol 
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occurred, which is recognized by many scholars as the actual birth of the Internet as we 
know it today. The use of the interconnected computers greatly enhanced command and 
control and it is clear that it is in this context that his first administration sought to 
maximize its use during and after crisis situations. 
President Reagan’s second term in office is significant in that it produced an EO 
and key legislation both refining and clarifying the duties of the federal government in 
response to crises that exceed the capabilities of local, state and tribal resources. 
a. Executive Order No. 12,381–Delegation of Emergency 
Management Functions (1982)  
Released September 8, 1982, Executive Order No. 12,381 briefly clarifies 
and amends EO 12,148 as to authorities delegated to the FEMA. Specifically, this EO 
recalls previously delegated presidential authorities which were originally granted via the 
Disaster Relief Act of 1974 and clearly assigns them to FEMA. The first such recalled 
authority related to the declaration of emergencies and major disasters (Executive Order 
No. 12,381, 1982, sect. 1).   
b. National Security Decision Directive No. 97–National Security 
Telecommunications Policy (1983)  
Released June 13, 1983 as a classified document, the National Security 
Decision Directive No. 97 (NSDD-97) made specific allowance for both “… assured 
connectivity between the National Command Authority and military forces” and “… 
recovery of critical national functions following crisis situations” (National Security 
Decision Directive No. 97, 1983, p. 2). This document also created a steering group to 
oversee implementation of stated objectives and to liaise with the Federal 
Communications Commission, FEMA, and National Security Telecommunications 
Advisory Committee (National Security Decision Directive No. 97, 1983, p. 3). 
c. Executive Order No. 12,656–Assignment of Emergency 
Preparedness Responsibilities (1988)  
Signed on November 18, 1988, Executive Order No. 12,656 does exactly 
what its title suggests—assigns national security emergency preparedness responsibilities 
  19
to federal departments and agencies based primarily on “… extensions of the regular 
missions of the departments and agencies” (Executive Order No. 12,656, 1988, sect. 
102(a)). The EO, in section 102(b), explicitly points out that it “… does not constitute 
authority to implement the plans prepared pursuant to this EO, but rather they could be 
acted on only in the event that authority for such execution is authorized separately by 
law.” This EO updated and superseded two previous EOs which addressed national 
emergency responsibilities—Executive Order No. 10,421 (December 31, 1952) and 
Executive Order No. 11,490 (October 28, 1969). Additionally, this EO was released in 
conjunction with the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 
(Public Law No. 93–88, as amended by Public Law No. 100–707) and directs that each 
federal agency lead appoint a senior policy official to develop and maintain a “… multi-
year, national security emergency preparedness plan for the department or agency to 
include objectives, programs, and budgetary requirements” (Executive Order No. 12,656, 
1988, sect. 201(3)).  
Together, the Stafford Act and Executive Order No. 12,656 lay the ground 
work for the development of the Federal Response Plan (FRP) to incidents of national 
significance. The primary difference between the verbiage of these documents and future 
documents lay in the supporting versus supported roles. In section 1702(1) of Executive 
Order No. 12,656 (1988), the Director of FEMA is directed to support other federal 
agencies in their preparation of national security emergency preparedness plans, whereas 
future documents shift the supported role to FEMA. 
d. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 
(1988)  
 Still in force today, the Stafford Act, as it is commonly referred to, 
amended the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (Public Law No. 93–288) as it related to federal 
government support of local, state and tribal efforts to recover from emergencies and 
disasters. Released November 23, 1988, the Stafford Act has received numerous revisions 
over the years since but still constitutes the statutory authority for most federal disaster 
response activities under FEMA. 
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3. President George H. W. Bush’s Administration  
Acknowledging that the presidential responsibilities were 
too vast to properly address as a lone individual using the current 
advisory councils, President George H.W. Bush (within days of 
inauguration) revitalized a standing advisory body of trusted 
advisors to aid him in the formation and reformation of national 
security. Despite this, catastrophic natural disasters in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s (e.g., 
the Loma Prieta earthquake, Hurricane Hugo, Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Iniki) 
generated intense criticism of the U.S. federal response mechanism and prompted an 
investigation into the U.S. plans and efforts surrounding disaster response, as authorized 
via the Stafford Act of 1988 (U.S. Government Accountability Office Report No. 
GOA/RCED-93–186, 1993, p. 1). This criticism sparked national attention on the 
reformation of the U.S. national strategy to the protection of CI/KR.  
a. National Security Directive No. 1–Organization of the National 
Security Council System (1989)  
Released on January 30, 1989, National Security Directive No. 1 (NSD-1) 
refocused the advisory council still in use today by the President to aid in decision 
making and enforcement of standing national policy—National Security Council (NSC) 
(National Security Directive No. 1, 1989, p. 1). Refocused is the operative word, as the 
NSC was actually created during President Harry S. Truman’s administration in 1947, but 
was viewed as an “… unwanted bureaucracy imposed upon the President by Congress” 
(Whittaker, 2011, p. 6).  
NSD-1, in the NSC revitalization, dissolved and replaced the: National 
Security Planning Group; Senior Review Group; Policy Review Group; and Planning and 
Coordination Group (National Security Directive No. 1, 1989, p. 4). It was the intention 
that the NSC committees (i.e., Principles Committee, Deputy Committee, Policy 
Coordinating Committees) be the sole vessels to address crisis management vice “… a 
separate interagency structure” (National Security Directive No. 1, 1989, p. 5).  
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b. Executive Order No. 12,673–Delegation of Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Functions (1989)  
Released March 23, 1989, Executive Order No. 12,673 delegated specific 
presidential functions to the Director of FEMA. This EO may look familiar as it is simply 
a near imitation of Executive Order No. 12,381, released seven years earlier and, like that 
EO, provided amendments to Executive Order No. 12,184 which empowered the Director 
of FEMA with functions previously granted to the President. The primary difference 
between the two EOs resides in the fact that Executive Order No.  12,381 delegated 
functions vested in the President by the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, and EO 12,673 
delegated functions vested in the President by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) of 1988. It is important to note that both 
documents explicitly retain the presidential authorities to declare emergencies and natural 
disasters. 
c. National Security Directive No. 10–Organization of the National 
Security Council System (1989)  
Released on May 7, 1989, National Security Directive No. 10 (NSD-10) 
specifically created nine Policy Coordinating Committees (PCC) authorized via NSD-1 
(National Security Directive No. 10, 1989, p. 1). This is significant as two of the nine 
PCCs directly relate to functions necessary post-cyber-attack on CI/KR and are still in 
use today. More specifically, the National Security Telecommunications PCC explicitly 
assumes the functions previously assigned via NSDD-97 to the National Security 
Telecommunications Policy Steering Group and is therefore responsible for continuity of 
communications between the military and the administration’s National Command 
Authority (National Security Directive No. 10, 1989, p. 3). Additionally, the Emergency 
Preparedness/Mobilization Planning PCC (chaired by the Director of FEMA) focuses on 
domestic administration policy with respect to national security (National Security 
Directive No. 10, 1989, p. 2).  
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d. Executive Order No. 12,803–Infrastructure Privatization (1992) 
Released April 30, 2009, Executive Order No. 12,803 remains one of the 
most controversial EOs signed. Under this EO, federally funded infrastructure assets 
owned by state and local governments are encouraged to be sold (aka: privatized) in order 
to “… ensure that the United States achieves the most beneficial economic use of its 
resources” (Executive Order No. 12,803, 1992). Examples of the infrastructure 
authorized for sale by states under Executive Order No. 12,803 include: roads, tunnels, 
bridges, electricity supply facilities, mass transit, rail transportation, airports, ports, 
waterways, water supply facilities, housing, schools, prisons, and hospitals (Executive 
Order No. 12,803, 1992, sect. 1(b)). This is significant as it further blurs the 
responsibility of the federal and state government to protect and/or defend critical 
infrastructure no longer owned by federal, state, or local governments. 
4. President William J. Clinton’s Administrations  
The commercialization of the Internet in the mid-1990s, 
combined with a domestic terror act, provided the impetus for the 
U.S. government to refocus on the protection of CI/KR because of 
emerging cyber threats. Succinctly stated, “… because our economy 
is increasingly reliant upon interdependent and cyber-supported 
infrastructures, non-traditional attacks on our infrastructure and information systems may 
be capable of significantly harming both our military power and our economy” 
(Presidential Decision Directive 63, 1998, p. 2).  
a. Presidential Decision Directive 39–U.S. Policy on 
Counterterrorism (1995)  
Following the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, President William J. Clinton released Presidential 
Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) on June 21, 1995. As such, PDD-39 directed the U.S. 
Attorney General to “… chair a Cabinet Committee to review the vulnerability to 
terrorism of government facilities in the United States and critical national infrastructure 
and make recommendations” back to the President (Presidential Decision Directive 39, 
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1995, p. 2). This event drove one of the first whole of government reviews of domestic 
vulnerabilities of the National Information Infrastructure (NII)—a term coined by the 
Information Infrastructure Task Force formed by Vice President Albert Gore (Security In 
Cyberspace, 1996, para. I(A)). The findings of the task force were later made public in a 
hearing by the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, titled Security in 
Cyberspace (June 5, 1996). This is the document which began the shift away from a 
holistic focus on national CIP and eventually aided in breaking out very specific threats, 
such as cyber. 
b. Executive Order No. 13,010–Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(1996)  
As seen in the direct quote below from Executive Order No. 13, 010, 
released five weeks after the Congressional Hearing on Security in Cyberspace, the U.S. 
government was cognizant of and specifically concerned with the governance of the 
fledgling interconnected autonomous systems—i.e., the Internet.  
Certain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or 
destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic 
security of the United States. These critical infrastructures include 
telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil storage and 
transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems, 
emergency services (including medical, police, fire, and rescue), and 
continuity of government. Threats to these critical infrastructures fall into 
two categories: physical threats to tangible property (“physical threats”), 
and threats of electronic, radio-frequency, or computer-based attacks on 
the information or communications components that control critical 
infrastructures (“cyber threats”). Because many of these critical 
infrastructures are owned and operated by the private sector, it is essential 
that the government and private sector work together to develop a strategy 
for protecting them and assuring their continued operation. (Executive 
Order No. 13,010, 1996, p. 1) 
This document is the first noted attempt to account for the vulnerability 
posed by the remote access to, and/or disruption of, critical infrastructure via cyber 
means and is clearly the start of the nation’s struggle to implement an effective and 
palatable cybersecurity strategy to protect the nation’s CI/KR. The use of the term cyber 
threat indicates a venue of attack to CI/KR and was not yet clearly included as part of CI, 
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as cyber networks are today. Regardless, due to these threats, President Clinton (through 
Executive Order No. 13,010) created the: 1) President’s Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP); 2) Principles Committee; 3) Steering Committee of the 
PCCIP; and 4) Advisory Committee to the PCCIP (Executive Order No. 13,010, 1996, p. 
1–2). It is important to note that this was the first cited attempt to identify and state the 
national importance of CIP in light of the then coined phase—Information Age. The most 
critical observation to make though is the presidential identification and distinction of 
physical and cyber threats.  
Under this Executive Order, President Clinton mandated the formation of 
the PCCIP and subsequent analysis of critical infrastructure in order to “… develop a 
strategy for protecting them and assuring their continued operation” (Executive Order 
No. 13,010, 1996, p. 1). 
c. Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructure 
(1997) 
Released in October 1997, the PCCIP’s findings are titled Critical 
Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructure. Primarily resultant to the majority of 
the infrastructure being privately owned and operated, the PCCIP concluded that CI 
protection is a shared national responsibility belonging to both the public and private 
sectors. Through this declaration, the PCCIP placed the protection of the nation’s CI at 
the whim of disparate private sector companies whose nationalistic allegiances are not 
necessarily higher in priority than their drive for profit generation.  
d. Presidential Decision Directive 63 (1998) 
In response to the report from his Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, on May 22, 1998, President Clinton signed and released Presidential Decision 
Directive 63 (PDD-63). The directive, titled Critical Infrastructure Protection, was 
designed to defend the nation’s critical infrastructure from physical and cyber-attack as 
identified in his previously released Executive Order 13,010 (1996). PDD-63 calls for a 
national effort to assure the security of the vulnerable and interconnected infrastructure of 
the United States (U.S.), most notably telecommunications. It went so far as to say, “… 
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the United States will take all necessary measures to swiftly eliminate any significant 
vulnerability to both physical and cyber-attacks on our critical infrastructures, including 
especially our cyber systems” (Presidential Decision Directive 63, 1998, sect. II). This 
quote is significant as it shows a shift in thinking; PDD-63 explicitly includes cyber 
systems in CI, whereas just two years prior in, Executive Order No. 13, 010 (1996), it 
was only a threat vector to CI. 
Additionally, PDD-63 is a significant milestone document as it is the first 
to identify, and assign Federal agency leads to, 15 critical infrastructure sectors 
(Presidential Decision Directive 63, 1998, sect. VI(1)). The CI/KR sectors, mainly still in 
use today, are listed in PDD-63 Appendix A (1998) as: 
 Information and Communications, 
 Banking and Finance, 
 Water Supply, 
 Aviation, 
 Highways,  
 Mass Transit,  
 Pipelines,  
 Rail,  
 Waterborne Commerce, 
 Emergency Law Enforcement Services, 
 Emergency Fire Service, 
 Continuity of Government Services, 
 Public Health Services, 
 Electric Power, and 
 Oil and Gas (production and storage). 
The foundation of PDD-63 stresses the critical importance of cooperation 
between the government and the private sector because the critical infrastructure of the 
U.S. is primarily owned and operated by the private sector (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 428). Note that this document also laid 
out a very specific goal of hardening our national critical infrastructure against intentional 
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attacks by the year 2003, via the creation of the Critical Infrastructure Coordination 
Group (CICG) (Presidential Decision Directive 63, 1998, sect. 2). This goal arguably has 
still not been met even 10 years after missing the deadline, but was very specific in the 
implementation guidance.  
This document further advocates a unity of effort strategy, as the created 
National Coordinator position was expressly created to “… not direct Departments and 
Agencies,” but rather simply to ensure interagency coordination for policy development 
and implementation. In essence, the National Coordinator was directed to implement and 
maintain a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan (NIAP), with no means of compliance 
incentivization. Additionally, to further the NIAP through unity of effort, the President 
directed the formation of the National Infrastructure Assurance Council (NIAC), which 
was later explicitly created under Executive Order No. 13,130, dated July 14, 1999, for 
the duration of two years. 
5. President George W. Bush’s Administrations  
As should be expected, the terror attacks perpetrated against 
the U.S. mainland on September 11, 2001 (colloquially referenced 
as 9/11) preemptively highlighted vulnerabilities in the U.S.’ 
national defense early in President George W. Bush’s 
administration. Following the attack, the nation’s political and 
public will uniformly aligned in the call to identify gaps in our security and national 
defense which made such horrendous events possible. While common sense after the fact 
would lead one to believe that this would assist in securing the national critical 
infrastructure, it did so in a way that retarded the efforts initiated under President Clinton. 
Unfortunately, 9/11 focused the national will myopically toward the Global War on 
Terrorism and discounted the likelihood of terrorists using cyber as their primary means 
of affecting the physical world. As such, the discussion of cyber threats, as introduced in 
Executive Order No. 13,010, essentially fell to the way-side in lieu of the desire to 
identify, interdict and disrupt physical attacks. Quite possibly the largest reaction, to the 
9/11 attacks, was the establishment of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and 
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subsequent absorption/subordination of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) (Executive Order No. 13,228, 2001; Homeland Security Act of 2002, 2002, sect. 
101(a)).  
A major part of the driven effort to identify gaps in national security by 
understanding the gaps exploited by the 9/11 terrorists was entrusted to the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), which 
produced a report—Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (The 9/11 Commission Report)—for the U.S. Congress and 
subsequently the U.S. public. It is incorrect to believe that this report was generated 
quickly or in sufficient time to mollify an incensed U.S. public. In fact, the 9/11 
Commission was not even formed until November 2002, over 14 months after the terror 
event. The 9/11 Commission Report was officially released July 22, 2004, after 
approximately 20 months of investigation, research and analysis. This is significant as, 
during that time lag, both President Bush’s administration and the U.S. Congress drafted 
and released numerous key documents which directly addressed a unified national 
response to domestic national defense breaches (e.g., Executive Order No. 13,231, 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 7, and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8).    
a. Executive Order No. 13,228–Establishing the Office of 
Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council (2001) 
Released under a month from the horrific 9/11 terror attacks, on October 
08, 2001, Executive Order No. 13,228, established the Office of Homeland Security and 
the Homeland Security Council.  
As this was a reflexive action to the lack of coordinated efforts of 
responders to the 9/11 attacks, the mission and function, as described in the EO, dictate 
that the Office of Homeland Security “… coordinate the executive branch’s efforts to 
detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks 
within the United States” (Executive Order No. 13,228, 2001, sect. 3). Executive Order 
No. 13,228, in a paragraph titled National Strategy, expressly directs that the Office of 
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Homeland Security “… work with executive departments and agencies, State and local 
governments, and private entities to ensure the adequacy of the national strategy … from 
terrorist threats or attacks within the United States and shall periodically review and 
coordinate revisions to that strategy as necessary” (Executive Order No. 13,228, 2001, 
sect. 3(a)). This is significant as it highlights the continuation of the unity of effort 
strategy previously imposed, but also allows the Office of Homeland Security the latitude 
to perform a reassessment and proposes a different national strategy.  
Although provided with a wide mandate initially, Executive Order No. 
13,228, in a paragraph titled Protection, expressly directs that the Office of Homeland 
Security shall coordinate efforts to “… protect the United States [sic] and its critical 
infrastructure” and to “…coordinate efforts to protect critical public and privately owned 
information systems within the United States from terrorist attack” (Executive Order No. 
13,228, 2001, sect. 3(e)). The specific verbiage in Section 3(e) is vital; this language is 
the basis for an on-going discussion with regard to the deconfliction of roles and 
responsibilities since the Office of Homeland Security is mandated to protect the nation, 
while the DoD mandate remains to defend the nation.  
b. Executive Order No. 13,231–Critical Infrastructure Protection in 
the Information Age (2001) 
Enacted within five weeks of the historic 9/11 terror attacks, on October 
16, 2001, Executive Order No. 13,231, titled Critical Infrastructure Protection in the 
Information Age, was signed and released. Under this EO, President Bush established the 
President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board (PCIPB) and specifically addressed 
the interdependent information systems integrated in CI (Executive Order No. 13,231, 
2001, sect. 2). This EO also designated the Chair of the PCIPB as the Special Advisor to 
the President for Cyberspace Security (Executive Order No. 13,231, 2001, sect. 7).  
To its credit, the PCIPB developed and released the National Strategy to 
Secure Cyberspace, in February 2003, identifying 24 strategic goals and listing 47 
specific recommendations (National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, 2003). As the 
nation’s open and technologically complex society includes a wide array of CI/KR that 
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are potential terrorist targets, the PCIPB released the strategy in draft form in September 
2002 for public comment and feedback (National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, 2003, p. 
2). This is significant as a majority of the CI are owned and operated by the private sector 
and State or local governments.  
This EO clearly carries the theme started by President Clinton, but is the 
last such document to emerge with such a direct focus, which highlights the shift from 
hardening cyber integrated infrastructure to physical protection under DHS.  
Interestingly enough, this is the document which delegated security 
responsibilities of the Executive Branch Information Systems to the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) and security responsibilities of National Security 
Information Systems to the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence 
(Executive Order No. 13,231, 2001, sect. 4). It also coincides with the passing of the 
Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001, which provides the U.S. policy with 
respect to CIP (42 U.S.C. 5195c, sect. c(1)). 
c. Homeland Security Act of 2002 
As early as 2002, Public Law No. 107–296 (more commonly known as the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002) assigned the DHS as the focal point for the security of 
cyberspace including: analysis; warning; information sharing; vulnerability reduction; 
mitigation efforts; and recovery efforts for public and private critical infrastructure and 
information systems (U.S. Government Accountability Office Testimony 11–865T, 
2011). This document is significant as it formally and legally reaffirms FEMA, in its new 
position under DHS, as the lead agency for the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and thus the 
lead for responding to cyber threats (Homeland Security Act of 2002, 2002, sect. 507(b)). 
The FRP was established via Executive Order No. 12,148 and Executive Order No. 
12,656 (Homeland Security Act of 2002, 2002, sect. 507(b)). 
d. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (2003)  
Released February 28, 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 
(HSPD-5), Directive on Management of Domestic Incidents, directed the development 
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and administration of the National Incident Management System (Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 5, 2003, para. 15). HSPD-5 also required the DHS to establish a 
framework for continuous coordination to provide strategic direction for, and oversight 
of, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) (Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 5, 2003, para. 17.b). This framework was later released in December 2004 as 
the National Response Plan. It one of the first national plans to take cyber into account, 
by means of an annex identified as the Cyber Incident Annex. This annex established 
procedures for a “… multidisciplinary, broad-based approach to prepare for, remediate, 
and recover from catastrophic cyber events impacting critical national processes and the 
national economy” (National Response Plan, 2004, p. xiii). 
e. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (2003) 
Released in 2003, the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-
7) “… establishes a national policy for Federal departments and agencies to identify and 
prioritize United States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from 
terrorist attacks” (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, 2003, p. 1). The directive 
expanded the definition of critical infrastructure as previously defined in the Critical 
Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001. Reverting back to much of President Clinton’s 
definition, this directive defines CI as the physical and virtual systems that are “… so 
vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets 
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public 
health or safety.”  
Unique in this document though is the specific reference to what will later 
be identified as critical sectors, but was then broken down into separate CI and KR 
categories, as built upon from the list provided in PDD-63 (1998). In paragraph (15), the 
document lists six CI sectors as “… information technology; telecommunications; 
chemical; transportation systems, including mass transit, aviation, maritime, 
ground/surface, and rail and pipeline systems; emergency services; and postal and 
shipping” (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, 2003, p. 4). Immediately 
following, the document lists three KR as dams, government facilities, and commercial 
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facilities (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, 2003, p. 4). Building on these, but 
assigning them to other federal agencies, a later paragraph additionally lists: agriculture; 
food; healthcare; water; energy; banking and finance; national monuments and icons; and 
the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) as eight additional CI sectors (Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 7, 2003, p. 5).   These distinctive lists, totaling 17 CI/KR sectors, 
are later refined again to create the 18 sectors listed in the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (NIPP) (National Disaster Recovery Framework, 2011, p. 58). 
Significantly, HSPD-7 reaffirms the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
direction in that DHS “… will continue to maintain an organization to serve as a focal 
point for the security of cyberspace … [which] includes analysis, warning, information 
sharing, vulnerability reduction, mitigation, and aiding national recovery efforts for 
critical infrastructure information systems” (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, 
2003, para. 16). 
f. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (2003) 
Released December 17, 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 
(HSPD-8), Directive on National Preparedness, augments HSPD-5 by directing the   
Secretary of Homeland Security to “… develop a national domestic all-hazards 
preparedness goal” (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, 2003, para. 5). As stated 
in the document, the term all-hazards preparedness refers to preparedness for domestic 
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. To achieve the goal, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security was directed to attempt standardization of training, 
equipment, and funding awards for first responders, to the extent possible and allowable 
by law (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, 2003). Although developed at the 
time, the national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, as directed in HSPD-8, has 
since been replaced, as directed in Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8), released in 
September 2011. 
g. The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) 
Released July 22, 2004, the Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (The 9/11 Commission Report), reported the 
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findings of a commission mandated to investigate “… facts and circumstances relating to 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.” The commission broke this down into two 
very basic questions: (1) how were the terrorist attacks on 9/11 allowed to occur 
unmitigated, and (2) what changes could be implemented to avoid a reoccurrence 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. xv)? In 
addressing the second question, the 9/11 Commission made the following 
recommendation: 
Recommendation: Emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt 
the Incident Command System (ICS).When multiple agencies or multiple 
jurisdictions are involved, they should adopt a unified command. Both are 
proven frameworks for emergency response. We strongly support the 
decision that federal homeland security funding will be contingent, as of 
October 1, 2004, upon the adoption and regular use of ICS and unified 
command procedures. In the future, the Department of Homeland Security 
should consider making funding contingent on aggressive and realistic 
training in accordance with ICS and unified command procedures. 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, 
p. 397) 
Although speculative, it is possible that the delay of the 9/11 Commission 
report’s release doomed some of their key findings and recommendations, since President 
Bush’s administration was moved by public outcry to move forward in an immediate and 
public reorganization, as seen by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Regardless, the 
above recommendation clearly suggests a unified command when multiple agencies or 
jurisdictions are involved, but it also limits the recommendation to response functions 
and training to that goal.  
Oddly enough, following their recommendation of a unified command, the 
9/11 Commission then dedicated an entire chapter on to how to reorganize the 
government. Four of the five section titles in that chapter begin with the words Unity of 
Effort (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 400–
419). Obviously, already discarding the proposal of a unified command, the 9/11 
Commission asked, and then answered, which agency is responsible for national 
domestic defense? They came to a conclusion and stated in the 9/11 Commission Report 
that “… national defense at home is the responsibility, first, of the Department of Defense 
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and, second, of the Department of Homeland Security,” with a follow-on caveat that they 
have clear delineations of responsibility and authority (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 427).   
To address the responsibilities of the DHS, the 9/11 Commission 
recommended that they should “… regularly assess the types of threats the country faces 
to determine (a) the adequacy of the government’s plans—and the progress against those 
plans—to protect America’s critical infrastructure and (b) the readiness of the 
government to respond to the threats that the United States might face” (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 428). This 
recommendation may look familiar as it was previously addressed in HSPD-5, HSPD-7, 
and HSPD-8 which were released during the compilation of the 9/11 Commission’s 
findings. 
h. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 Annex 1 (2007) 
Augmenting guidance found in HSPD-8 and the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security (2007), HSPD-8 Annex 1 was released December 4, 2007 and added 
additional requirements to HSPD-8 and then amended both HSPD-5 and HSPD-8 in an 
effort to establish conformity. Specifically, HSPD-8 Annex 1 established the requirement 
for the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a standardized comprehensive 
approach to national planning, termed the Integrated Planning System (Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 8 Annex 1, 2007, para. 33). More importantly though, this 
document directed the development of National Planning Scenarios using a risk-based 
analysis model, “… intended to focus planning efforts on the most likely or most 
dangerous threats to the homeland” (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 Annex 
1, 2007, para. 34). These National Planning Scenarios are required to:  
 have a strategic guidance statement developed by the Secretary of 
Homeland Security;  
 have a strategic plan developed in consultation with other Federal agencies 
within 90 days of the strategic guidance statement being issued;  
 have a concept of operations plan (CONPLAN) developed within 180 
days of a strategic plan being approved;  
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 have an operations plan (OPLAN) developed within 120 days of 
CONPLAN approval;  
 be included in budgetary submissions (for planning and execution) by 
affected Federal agencies to the Office of Management and Budget; and  
 be updated no less frequently than on a biennial basis. 
6. President Barrack H. Obama’s Administrations  
According to the 29th U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
William J. Lynn (III): following the “… most significant breach of 
U.S. military computers ever” in 2008, via malicious code injection 
through a foreign purchased flash drive, “… the Pentagon … 
formally recognized cyberspace as a new domain of warfare” 
(Lynn, 2010, p. 101). As such, the “… Pentagon’s operation to counter the attack, known 
as Operation Buckshot Yankee, marked a turning point in U.S. cyberdefense strategy” 
(Lynn, 2010, p. 97).  
Inheriting this chaotic environment, within a month of President Barrack H. 
Obama’s inauguration, his administration called for the now anticipated review of the 
nation’s strategy to protect critical infrastructure and key resources from the cyber threat.  
The below quote is from the Assistant to the President for Counterterrorism and 
Homeland Security John Brennan, as captured in a White House press statement 
publically released on February 09, 2009 and is one of the many documents/statements 
released wherein officials wrestle with the amorphous topic of cyber and its 
interdisciplinary integrative nature (Greenwald, 2010, p. 41).  
The national security and economic health of the United States depend on 
the security, stability, and integrity of our Nation’s cyberspace, both in the 
public and private sectors. The President is confident that we can protect 
our nation’s critical cyber infrastructure while at the same time adhering to 
the rule of law and safeguarding privacy rights and civil liberties. (White 
House Press Office, 2009)  
a. Cyberspace Policy Review (2009) 
The aforementioned White House press statement, released February 9, 
2009, also publically announced that President Barack H. Obama directed his National 
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Security and Homeland Security Advisors to conduct a 60-day interagency review to 
develop a strategic framework to ensure that U.S. government cyber security initiatives 
were appropriately integrated, resourced and coordinated with Congress and the private 
sector. The subsequent findings of the 60-day review, titled Cyberspace Policy Review: 
Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure, were 
released 110 days later on May 29, 2009 (Greenwald, 2010, p. 41). 
b. Presidential Policy Directive 8–National Preparedness (2011) 
Signed by President Obama on March 30, 2011, the DHS/FEMA 
coordinated the input for, and compilation of, the multi-agency generated PPD-8 as a 
means to update the authorities necessary to address the national preparedness system as 
required in the Post-Katrina Act of 2006; Subtitle C (Lindsay, 2012, p. 4). This document 
is a lodestone document; PPD-8 drives the majority of the national preparedness 
documents and procedures currently in effect, or in progress of generation, today. 
Explicitly pointed out in the first paragraph though is the unity of effort approach as the 
directive is “… intended to galvanize … an integrated, all-of-Nation [sic], capabilities-
based approach to preparedness” (Presidential Policy Directive 8, 2011, p. 1).  
This directive explicitly “… replaces Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive (HSPD)-8 (National Preparedness), issued December 17, 2003, and HSPD-8 
Annex I (National Planning), issued December 4, 2007, which were rescinded” 
(Presidential Policy Directive 8, 2011). On closer inspection, this document orders the 
exact same approach directed in HSPD-5, HSPD-8 and HSPD-8 Annex 1, as it also 
required the generation of a national preparedness goal and standardized framework(s) to 
manage the NIMS. It does uniquely identify though that the strategy employed will be an 
all-of-nation approach vice whole-of-government or federal approach. This shift in 
terminology is significant and is the topic of discussion later in this thesis. It also directs 
the genesis and submission of a National Preparedness Goal and National Planning 
Framework by which to achieve the goal. 
(1) National Preparedness Goal 
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The current national preparedness goal generated in response to 
PPD-8, and provided via the FEMA website, is: “A secure and resilient nation with the 
capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, 
respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk” (National 
Preparedness Goal, 2011, p. 1). 
(2) National Planning Framework 
To address the requirements of standardized frameworks, and in an 
effort to implement the structure necessary to achieve this goal, PPD-8 breaks the 
National Preparedness System down into five mission areas, each one requiring a 
blueprint referred to as a National Planning Framework. The five preparedness mission 
areas are more thoroughly addressed in the next chapter, as it discusses current 
implementation vice policy.  
c. Presidential Policy Directive 20 (2012) 
Signed October 26, 2012, and released November 2012, the classification 
of the PPD-20 precludes open discussion at this level and so is noted solely for posterity.  
d. Executive Order No. 13,636–Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity (2013) 
Signed on February 12, 2013, President Obama released Executive Order 
No. 13,636 which directs federal agencies to develop voluntary cybersecurity standards 
for critical parts of the private sector and to consider proposing new mandates where 
possible under existing law. Incorporating many points from the numerous cyber bills 
that failed to be passed in both houses of the U.S. Congress in the most recent session, 
this EO requires federal agencies to produce unclassified reports of threats to U.S. 
companies and to share them in a timely manner with the private-sector (Executive Order 
No. 13,636, 2013, sect. 4(a)). Also, reiterated in the EO is the call for voluntary 
disclosure of cyber-related incidents and threats detected by the private sector with the 
federal government through established relationships, such as the via the DHS National 
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). This bi-directional 
information sharing initiative is to be augmented by a national cyber framework by which 
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CI of the national infrastructure is monitored and assessed, thus increasing visibility of 
the cyber health of the nation’s CI/KR.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
As documented above, although concerns about the proper organization of federal 
responses to national security threats has been a consistent issue across many presidential 
administrations, it appears that crisis is required to galvanize public and private will to 
question preparedness. As described above, it was not until a series of catastrophic 
natural disasters in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s and the terror attacks perpetrated on U.S. 
soil that intense public criticism of the U.S.’ federal response mechanism prompted 
investigation into the U.S.’ plans and efforts surrounding disaster response (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office Report No. GOA/RCED-93–186, 1993, p. 1). As 
shown, much of the previous work on proactive national federal strategy to respond to 
Incidents of National Significance has been generated by the Executive Branch of the 
U.S. government in the form of various Executive Orders, Presidential Decision 
Directives, Homeland Security Presidential Directives, and Presidential Policy 
Directives. These key references, spanning about thirty-five years, have been created by 
multiple administrations with differing views and motivations. Although starting out 
generally addressing the federal response plans surrounding emergencies and disasters 
thirty five years ago, in the last 17 years the national focus has shifted with the newest 
threat: cyber. During this time, three separate U.S. presidents initiated a strategy 
assessment with respect to addressing cyber vulnerabilities of the national CI/KR. 
Prompted by a domestic act of terrorism, President Clinton’s administration 
directed an investigation of CI vulnerabilities in PDD-39 (1995) and subsequently 
identified the critical vulnerability created by interdependent and cyber-supported 
infrastructures in the release of Executive Order No. 13,010 (1996). As such, President 
Clinton directed the creation of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (PCCIP) to conduct an analysis of CI in order to protect them and maintain 
assurance of their continued operation in times of crisis. Following the receipt of 
PCCIP’s report, Critical Foundations, President Clinton released PDD-63 which 
  38
implements a personalized version of the unity of effort strategy by breaking the critical 
infrastructure into sectors and parsing out lead roles to Federal agencies. 
The terror attacks on 9/11, at the beginning of President Bush’s administration, 
preemptively highlighted vulnerabilities in the U.S. national defense of CI/KR. As such, 
through the release of Executive Orders No. 13,228 and 13,231, just weeks after the 
terror attack, President Bush directed the formation of both the DHS and PCIPB. 
Following the immediate response and formation of those bodies, the creation of the 9/11 
Commission was directed to conduct an analysis of CI and agency roles using experts and 
insiders. Understandingly, his administration was required to act immediately though, 
prior to the compilation of findings. Therefore, even before submission of findings by the 
congressionally directed commission, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, HSPD-5, 
HSPD-7, and HSPD-8 were released in the span of 13 months and highlighted the whole 
of government approach, which equates to the unity of effort strategy. Following the 
receipt of the 9/11 Commission’s report, Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004), President Bush released HSPD-8 Annex 
1 which simply further implements his administration’s reflexive unity of effort strategy 
established in the previously released documents and essentially ignored the 
recommendation citing the unity of command strategy.  
President Obama’s administration identified the critical vulnerability inherent in 
the nation’s cyberspace early in his first term following the “… most significant breach of 
U.S. military computers ever” in 2008 (Lynn, 2010, p. 97). As such, he directed his 
National Security and Homeland Security Advisors to conduct a Cyberspace Policy 
Review in order to develop a strategic framework with which to ensure integration and 
coordination with the U.S. Congress and the private sector. Following the receipt of the 
report from the Cyberspace Policy Review, President Obama released PPD-8, PPD-20 
and Executive Order No. 13,656 which implements yet a third personalized version of the 
‘Unity of Effort’ strategy. 
Documented above, from the last three U.S. presidents, is that all of the efforts 
from 1996 to present to address protecting national CI from cyber threats seem circular in 
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nature as each new presidential administration in the last 17 years: (1) identifies a critical 
vulnerability in the national defense of critical infrastructure, (2) creates a committee of 
experts and insiders to research and evaluate issues, and (3) then implements a 
personalized unity of effort strategy.  
The following chapter outlines the current unity of effort implementation via the 
national preparedness system, as directed by PPD-8, and then is followed by a chapter 
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III. UNITY OF EFFORT–CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION 
According to the presidentially directed Cyberspace Policy Review released May 
29, 2009, securing cyberspace “… transcends the jurisdictional purview of individual 
departments and agencies because … no single agency has a broad enough perspective or 
authority to match the sweep of the problem” (Cyberspace Policy Review, 2009, p. iv). 
Subsequently, President Barrack H. Obama issued PPD-8 on May 30, 2011 which 
directed “… the development of a national preparedness goal that identifies the core 
capabilities necessary for preparedness and a national preparedness system to guide 
activities that will enable the Nation to achieve the goal” (Presidential Policy Directive 8, 
2011, p. 1). 
A. NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL 
The National Preparedness Goal is a document generated in response to PPD-8 
and released as a First Edition in September 2011. The document identifies the core 
capabilities needed to deal with significant risks to the Nation and was developed to  
“… reflect the policy direction outlined in the National Security Strategy (May 2010)” 
(Presidential Policy Directive 8, 2011, p. 2).  
1. National Preparedness Goal 
The actual preparedness goal, as listed on page one of the document, is also 
provided on the FEMA website as: “A secure and resilient nation with the capabilities 
required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, 
and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk” (National 
Preparedness Goal, 2011, p. 1).  
2. Mission Areas 
To aid in building the requisite capabilities needed to achieve the national 
preparedness goal, five mission areas, shown in Figure 1, were identified: prevention, 
protection, mitigation, response, and recovery (National Preparedness Goal, 2011, p. 2). 
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These mission areas are intended as overarching categories which are comprised of core 
capabilities.  
 
Figure 1.  National Preparedness Mission Areas (From National Prevention  
Framework, 2013, p. 1)  
3. Core Capabilities 
Additionally, the National Preparedness Goal lists 31 core capabilities, 
subordinated under the five mission areas, deemed necessary to achieve the stated 
national preparedness goal. Graphically depicted in Table 1 is the alignment of the core 
capabilities under the five national preparedness mission areas (National Preparedness 
Goal, 2011, p. 2). One of the core capabilities, as noted in Table 1, is Cybersecurity 
subordinated under the Protection mission area. Although the majority of the core 
capabilities have a cyber aspect, the discussion that follows will focus on the highlighted 
ones in Table 1. In review of the individual documents, these seem to more directly 
support cybersecurity of the CI/KR subset. Because the documents describe the other 
core capabilities in a broader holistic view, the focus is on the highlighted entries.  
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Table 1.   Core Capabilities by Mission Area (From National Preparedness  
Goal, 2011, Table 1) 
B. NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM 
As directed by the guidance provided in PPD-8, the National Preparedness 
System was released by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in November 2011 as 
a 10-page document. Still in use today, the underlying purpose of the document is to 
outline the phases by which the Nation will “… employ to build, sustain, and deliver 
those core capabilities in order to achieve the goal of a secure and resilient Nation” 
(National Preparedness System, 2011, p. 1). This document identifies and describes six 
components of the National Preparedness System, which are listed as: identifying and 
assessing risk, estimating capabilities required, building or sustaining required 
capabilities, planning to deliver required capabilities, validating and monitoring 
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capability progress, and reviewing and updating efforts for continuous improvement 
(National Preparedness System, 2011, p. 1).  
1. Identifying and Assessing Risk  
As the first component to a six-step cyclical process, the first step relies on the 
creation and execution of risk assessments—Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk 
Assessments (THIRA), Strategic National Risk Assessments (SNRA), and specialized 
risk assessments (National Preparedness System, 2011, p. 2). Below the national level, 
THIRA guidance is being developed and planned to “… provide a common, consistent 
approach for identifying and assessing risks and associated impacts,” enabling improved 
integration of threats into the overall risk assessment process (National Preparedness 
System, 2011, p. 2). The national level will primarily rely on the SNRA and specialized 
risk assessments to identify the greatest risks to the nation (National Preparedness 
System, 2011, p. 2). 
a. Strategic National Risk Assessment 
The SNRA was released in December 2011 in both classified (full 
version) and unclassified (sanitized) documents. For discussion, the unclassified version 
of the SNRA was used in this paper, as it highlights the “… evaluated … risk from 
known threats and hazards that have the potential to significantly impact the Nation’s 
homeland security” (Strategic National Risk Assessment, 2011, p. 1). Of the identified 
ten national-level threats generated from an adversary, as depicted in Table 2, two of 
those utilize the cyber domain, but set clearly delineated thresholds for effects of cyber-
attacks which in and of themselves are difficult to assess and definitively quantify in 
monetary values.  
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Table 2.   Strategic National Risk Assessment–Adversarial Risks  
(From Strategic National Risk Assessment, 2011, Table 1)  
The overall utility of the identification of the cyber threat in the SNRA is 
useful, but precluded by the clearly defined monetary threshold to meet the poorly written 
national-level event criteria. Specifically, the chosen wording is likely over-simplified in 
addressing the cyber threat as it exists in today’s world, whether intentional or not. Two 
keys issues with the description: (1) it omits addressing confidentiality, as a key 
  46
component of cybersecurity; and (2) it omits accounting for coordinated efforts resulting 
in multiple attacks.  
The description for a cyber-attack on data, listed in Table 2, takes into 
account only two of the three aspects of the Cybersecurity triad—integrity and 
availability. As such, this description is limited to denial of service attacks and 
modification, deletion, and injection of data. It therefore omits the third aspect of 
Cybersecurity—confidentiality. This is notable as the May 2013 NIST Glossary of Key 
Information Security Terms cites the Committee on National Security Systems 
Instruction 4009, titled National Information Assurance (IA) Glossary, when defining 
cyber-attack, which  includes “… stealing controlled information” (Glossary of Key 
Information Security Terms, 2013, p. 57; Committee on National Security Systems 
Instruction 4009, 2010, p. 22). This omission, however, is therefore likely intended to 
keep the INS thresholds focused on keeping the national CI/KR up and running; theft of 
information does not have the same impact, at least in the near term. 
Additionally, both descriptions highlighted above suggest a single cyber-
attack (or incident) versus a coordinated set of attacks or campaign by a group or 
individual. In today’s world, following the release of Cybersecurity reports such as the 
Mandiant APT1 report (released in 2013) highlighting dedicated coordinated cyber-
attacks to undermine proprietary information important to the U.S. economy (APT1: 
Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, 2013). To further highlight this 
deficiency, Chairman Mike Rogers of the U.S. House of Representative Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence stated on February 14, 2013 in an open congressional hearing 
that “… China’s pervasive and growing economic cyber espionage campaign against 
American companies … has grown exponentially both in terms of its volume and the 
damage it is doing to our nation’s economic future … because some of our most 
innovative ideas and sensitive information are being brazenly stolen by these cyber-
attacks” (Rogers, 2013).  Although Chairman Rogers’ use of the term cyber-attack to 
refer to incidents of espionage, others use the term cyber-attack solely in the sense of 
disruption or denial. This distinction remains a significant topic of on-going diplomatic 
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and academic debates as the cyber lexicon is not standardized. This highlights one such 
example of the necessity for standardized lexicon for the cyber realm. 
2. Estimating Capabilities Required  
The National Preparedness System guidance for this step directs the use of the 
risk assessment results to determine the required types and levels of capabilities required 
to achieve outcome(s) for each mission area (National Preparedness System, 2011, pp. 2–
3). The requirements analysis is crucial to proper risk assessment and allocation of 
resources. 
3. Building or Sustaining Required Capabilities 
The National Preparedness System guidance for this step directs the creation of 
the required capabilities after an initial assessment of current ones, based on risk 
mitigation of highest priority first (National Preparedness System, 2011, p. 3). The 
sustainment of core capabilities are stated to be maintained through training and 
education: the National Training & Education System (NTES) will support the National 
Preparedness System by integration of government training facilities, academic 
institutions, and private organizations (National Preparedness System, 2011, p. 3). Aiding 
this objective as recently as March 2013, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), working with federal government agencies, public and private 
experts and organizations, and industry partners, via the NIST National Initiative for 
Cybersecurity Education provided a document to address the common understanding of 
cybersecurity work: National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework (National 
Cybersecurity Workforce Framework, 2013).  
4. Planning to Deliver Required Capabilities 
Finally delivering tangible and clearly directed guidance, this section of the 
document introduces the National Planning System, as it is intended to support the 
delivery of the core capabilities identified in the National Preparedness Goal (National 
Preparedness System, 2011, p. 4). This is significant as the National Planning System 
lays out the guidance for a collaboratively developed set of coordinated National 
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Frameworks, developed to focus the whole of government on how they should prepare to 
“… deliver capabilities in each of the five mission areas” (National Preparedness System, 
2011,  p. 4). Therefore, it is in this step of the National Preparedness System that the 
plans are being made to address the gaps in required capabilities and current ones through 
the National Frameworks of the National Planning System. 
5. Validating and Monitoring Capability Progress  
The progress toward the National Preparedness Goal fulfillment is done through 
“… exercises, remedial action management programs, and assessments” (National 
Preparedness System, 2011,  p. 5). This section is highly dependent on internal 
motivation at the organizational level and lacks significant oversight or responsibility 
assignment. For example, the National Preparedness System identifies the comprehensive 
assessment system (CAS) as a primary means of monitoring and justifies CAS use, but 
then omits the identification of the organization responsible, method of dissemination, 
and actions available for remediation (National Preparedness System, 2011, p. 5).   
6. Reviewing and Updating Efforts 
This section simply identifies the need for periodic reassessments of the core 
capabilities, but is otherwise unhelpful (National Preparedness System, 2011, p. 6).   
7. Conclusion 
Overall, this high-level document, encompassing everything from chemical spills 
to cyber-attacks, and therefore does not address specific processes or baseline any of the 
core capabilities provided in the National Preparedness Goal. A specific exception would 
be the direction to complete SNRA’s and direction to revisit them periodically, which is 
worked into the National Planning System. Otherwise, this high-level document 
(National Preparedness System) highlights the nascent efforts of the federal response by 
focusing on six areas of common interest.  
The extension of the National Preparedness Goal, and alignment of the 31 core 
capabilities under the five mission areas, is more clearly shown in the National Planning 
System. 
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C. NATIONAL PLANNING SYSTEM 
To address the requirements of standardized frameworks for each of the five 
national preparedness mission areas, and in an effort to implement the structure necessary 
to achieve this goal, PPD-8 breaks the National Preparedness System down into five 
corresponding blueprints, referred to as a National Planning Frameworks. These 
frameworks together are termed the National Planning System and are designed to 
provide a “… detailed concept of operations; a description of critical tasks and 
responsibilities; detailed resource, personnel, and sourcing requirements; and specific 
provisions for the delivery of capabilities under each Framework by the Federal 
Government” (National Preparedness System, 2011, p. 4). They also address how the 
federal government will support state, territorial, tribal, and local plans and “… the 
frameworks are used to designate roles and responsibilities …” of the 33 core capabilities 
identified in the National Preparedness Goal (National Preparedness System, 2011, p. 4). 
The five preparedness mission areas of the National Planning System, addressed in PPD-
8, are listed below as prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. Covered 
below in more detail, three of the mandated frameworks were published in May 2013; 
one framework remains unpublished; and the final framework is operating from a legacy 
document dated from September 2011, which states that it will be updated after the initial 
four frameworks are published and released. 
1. National Prevention Framework 
The National Prevention Framework, released in May 2013, addresses the process 
of preparing the nation to prevent an imminent terrorist attack, as the other frameworks 
more fully account for natural disaster, hazards and incidents (Lindsay, 2012, pp. 4–5). 
Specifically, the National Prevention Framework “… sets the strategy and doctrine for 
building, sustaining, and delivering the core capabilities for Prevention identified in the 
National Preparedness Goal” (National Prevention Framework, 2013, p. 1). More 
importantly, it assigns roles and responsibilities to the seven associated core capabilities, 
two of which are directly pertinent to the cyber threat—Intelligence and Information 
Sharing, and Interdiction and Disruption.  
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a. Intelligence and Information Sharing 
Numerous national incidents (e.g., 9/11 and Oklahoma City bombing) 
point to the fact that “… no single agency, department, or level of government can 
independently complete a threat picture of all terrorism and national security threats” 
(National Prevention Framework, 2013, p. 11). As such, cyber events are rarely isolated 
events and are highly dependent on the isolation of individual networks and 
compartmentalization of discovered threats. 
Thus, in accordance with existing laws, directives, and policies, this core 
capability relies on the full “… information sharing and analysis of federal agencies; state 
and major urban area fusion centers; and the intelligence community during times of 
imminent threat” (National Prevention Framework, 2013, p. 11). To be effective, this 
means that intelligence collection prioritization and socialization is required across all 
concerned agencies so that the limited national assets and resources can be appropriately 
apportioned. This necessity affects law enforcement, the DoD, the DHS and private 
organizations and is directly applicable to cyber-attacks conducted by terrorist 
organizations. 
b. Interdiction and Disruption 
Of the nine critical tasks listed in the National Prevention Framework, the 
final critical task, under the section titled Interdiction and Disruption, is directly relevant 
in terms of cyber threats as employed by terrorists: “…strategically deploy assets to 
interdict, deter or disrupt threats from reaching potential target(s)” (National Prevention 
Framework, 2013, p. 13). 
From a cyber-centric viewpoint, this specific critical task reinforces the 
EINSTEIN use by DHS and similar systems, such as those employed by the DoD to 
prevent unauthorized intrusions into the Global Information Grid (GIG). Of note, 
EINSTEIN, DHS’ integrated Intrusion Detection System (IDS)/Intrusion Protection 
System (IPS) hybrid is discussed at more length in Chapter IV, para. A.3.d(1). 
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2. National Protection Framework 
While not yet published, the National Protection Framework is clearly the most 
germane document of the National Planning System to the national cyber strategy to 
protect CI/KR. As shown in Table 1 previously, of the five mission areas, Protection not 
only has the continuation of both of the previously identified core capabilities, but also 
has the only directly applicable core capability—Cybersecurity. That fact, coupled with 
the DHS mandate to protect CI, insinuates that the National Protection Framework will 
be a lodestone document identifying Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities, once 
published and released. It is also important to make the distinction that the National 
Protection Framework is likely to not be as restrictive as the National Prevention 
Framework, and will therefore encompass more than the singularity of a terrorist use of 
the cyber domain to attack national CI/KR. 
3. National Mitigation Framework 
The National Mitigation Framework, released in May 2013, addresses the process 
of risk management and the selection and implementation of mitigating factors and 
processes. This mission area is heavily reliant on accurate and updated situational 
awareness of vulnerabilities, as provided in the SNRAs and special assessments.  
Although significant to the overall process, this document offers little other than 
distinct support for the unity of effort concept in the roles and responsibilities as shown in 
Table 3. Two of these roles and responsibilities, highlighted in the table, directly tie back 
to the SNRA which is used to identify the current threats and hazards.  
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Table 3.   Mitigation Roles and Responsibilities  
(From National Mitigation Framework, 2013, Table 1) 
Significant to the discussion is that although listed in the table above as having 
roles and responsibilities, the categories of Individuals, Families and Households; 
Communities; Nongovernmental Organizations; and Private Sector Entities are in no way 
compelled by or accountable to the National Preparedness Goal, National Planning 
System, or National Mitigation Framework. Thus Table 3 is an ideal that relies either on 
a strong sense of nationalistic pride or broader understanding of the interdependent nature 
of national CI/KR by otherwise self-serving entities. The only value is for planners to 
realize that the span of control is beyond that which they can directly affect without 
significant private-sector buy-in or ownership. This line of thinking returns to the 
previous argument that the majority of the entities listed are for-profit and affected only 
by their profitability. Thus, mitigation of risks and hazards as identified in the SNRA may 
not be fully embraced if it cuts into their holdings or creates ancillary compliance 
requirements. Post-INS event response is more likely to generate the desired level of 
cooperation. 
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4. National Response Framework 
The National Response Framework (NRF) pre-dated the National Preparedness 
System in its first version, released in 2008 to supersede the National Response Plan 
(NRP). Following the direction of the guidance in PPD-8, the second version, 
subordinated under the National Preparedness Goal, was published in May 2013.  
The NRF, in its updated form, describes “… the principles, roles and 
responsibilities, and coordinating structures for delivering the core capabilities required 
to respond to an incident” (National Response Framework, 2013, p. i). As such, it has 
specific annexes to address specific incidents and explicitly covers emergencies and 
disasters resulting from cyber intrusions (National Response Framework, 2013, p. 5).  
a. Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Support Annex 
Released in January 2008, the CI/KR Support Annex details the roles and 
responsibilities relative to the National Response Framework (2008, 1st Ed.) (Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resources Support Annex, 2008, p. 1). Graphically depicted in 
Table 4, this annex breaks down the national CI/KR into 17 sectors and assigns Sector-
Specific Agencies (SSA) to act as the lead on each. Information sharing internal to the 
SSAs can be done through many means, but the primary framework continues to be via 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), first introduced in PPD-63 (1998) 
(Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Support Annex, 2008, p. 3).  
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Table 4.   CI/KR Assignments to Sector-Specific Agencies (From Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resources Support Annex, 2008, Table A-1) 
Highlighted in Table 4, the DHS Office of Cyber Security and 
Communications (CS&C) is assigned as the lead SSA for both the Information 
Technology and Communications CI sectors. This apparent assignment may be 
misleading, though, when addressing an INS originating from a cyber-threat, as cyber-
attacks can have catastrophic consequences and cascading effects into other CI sectors 
(e.g., Dams, Transportation Systems, and Banking and Finance) (National Mitigation 
Framework, 2013, p. 6). Inasmuch, cyber-attacks on the national CI/KR will likely be 
dealt with in the duality in which they exist; DoD will utilize their defend the nation 
mandate to counter, degrade, or disrupt the attack while DHS will exercise their protect 
the nation mandate by leading efforts to respond, mitigate and eventually recover from 
the damage caused by the attack(s).  
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5. National Recovery Framework 
Pre-dating the release of the National Preparedness System, the DHS recovery 
efforts are currently coordinated in accordance with the National Disaster Recovery 
Framework (NDRF), published in September 2011. When the National Recovery 
Framework is published it will replace the older NDRF. With the acknowledgment that 
the revised framework will need to be compatible with the other frameworks, the NDRF 
itself states that it will be revised as the National Preparedness System is further 
developed and the other preceding frameworks of prevention, protection, mitigation and 
response frameworks are finished (National Disaster Recovery Framework, 2011, p. 7). 
Although not yet accomplished, such a revision should ensure that actions listed to be 
taken in the NDRF are coordinated within the spirit of the other frameworks and 
appropriately provide the next logical step in the preparedness continuum. 
Presumably due to the fact that this is a legacy framework, the NDRF accounts 
for the core capability of Infrastructure Systems, not as a core capability, but rather 
references it as a Recovery Support Function (RSF) (National Disaster Recovery 
Framework, 2011, p. 37). The RSF correspondingly was assigned a pre-designated 
coordinating agency to promote communication and collaboration, as well as assigning 
primary supported agencies.  
a. Infrastructure Systems  
The DoD U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is listed as the 
coordinating agency for infrastructure systems, with DHS (FEMA and NPPD), 
DoD/USACE, Department of Energy (DOE), and Department of Transportation (DOT) 
listed as the primary supported agencies (National Disaster Recovery Framework, 2011, 
p. 58). Therefore, although DHS has the lead for ensuring the National Preparedness Goal 
mission area of recovery is properly utilized following an INS, DoD (via USACE) is the 
actual coordinating agency for addressing the core capability of infrastructure systems. In 
light of a cyber-attack on those systems, it must be assumed coordinating authority does 
not equate to sole responsibility, as cyber infrastructure will need to be analyzed for 
intentional or unintentional parasitic malware by industry and cybersecurity experts. 
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Although the NIMS covers both of the concepts of multi-agency coordination 
(unity of effort) and unity of command in the command and management component, the 
newly formed National Planning System focuses on implementing only the former 
(National Incident Management System, 2008, p. 48).  
To implement the unity of effort approach, the National Preparedness Goal, as 
reiterated by the National Preparedness System, is implemented through the National 
Planning System in five mission areas and 31 core capabilities. Although not fully 
developed and released, the five parallel frameworks tied to the mission areas detail the 
roles and responsibilities corresponding to core capabilities. More specifically, defending 
our nation’s CI/KR from the cyber threat is a task comprised of many core capabilities, 
but the key one (Cybersecurity) has not been fully addressed, as the National Protection 
Framework has yet to be released.  
Finally, although addressed in the SNRA, identification of the cyber INS 
threshold is useful but precluded by: the difficulty in definitively calculating monetarily 
defined effects post cyber-attack, in order to assess the damage in relation to the 
significant thresholds to meet the national-level event criteria; and the singularity of the 
term attack and incident, thus discounting the coordinated campaigns and attacks 
observed (e.g., Georgia, and 2012–2013 attacks on U.S. Banking and Financial sector) 
(Hollis, 2011; Perlroth & Sanger, 2013). 
Therefore, although significant time and effort has been devoted to capturing the 
process of implementing the frameworks to build and assess the core capabilities, little in 
the way of cyber-related roles and capabilities are directly addressed to date. Despite this, 
many federal agencies continue to operate under standing authorities with the intent to 
address what they view as their mission in the operational cyber domain. The next 
chapter addresses some of those authorities as a nascent effort to identify the key 
agencies and existing authorities. 
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IV. AUTHORITIES, ROLES, AND EFFORTS 
The Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 states that the official U.S. 
policy is that “… any physical or virtual disruption of the operation of the critical 
infrastructures of the United States be rare, brief, geographically limited in effect, 
manageable, and minimally detrimental to the economy, human and government services, 
and national security of the United States” (42 U.S.C. 5195c, sect. c(1)). 
To achieve this, with applicable statutory authorities already in place, the U.S. 
previously managed crises through the separate lenses of national defense, law 
enforcement, and emergency management prior to the initiation of the ongoing policy 
discussion of homeland security (Painter, 2013, p. 2). The terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001, however, did in fact initiate that discussion through an immediate review of 
U.S. strategic policies that included a debate over, and the development of, a holistic 
national domestic defense policy—termed homeland security policy. The 9/11 
Commission Report specifically recommended that the DHS regularly assess threats to 
determine the adequacy of the government’s plans to protect America’s CI and the 
readiness of the U.S. government to respond (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 
2004, p. 428). As such, discussion, development, and evolution of domestic policy over 
the last 12 years have resulted in numerous federal agencies with homeland security 
responsibilities and funding. For example, multiple Congressional Research Service 
reports, released early 2013, point out that there are 30 federal agencies that receive 
annual homeland security funding, excluding the DHS (Painter, 2013, p. 2; Reese, 2013, 
p. 1; OMB, 2013). Additionally, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimates 
that 48% of annual homeland security funding is appropriated to these federal agencies, 
with the DHS receiving approximately 52% (Reese, 2013, p. 1).  
It should appear obvious to even the casual observer that, to achieve the stated 
policy and with so many federal agencies involved, cyberspace functions can and 
frequently do significantly overlap; cyberspace operations, as outlined in 2009, were 
executed throughout the multiple federal executive agencies as authorized by U.S. Code 
(U.S.C.): Title 6 (Domestic Security); Title 10 (Armed Forces); Title 18 (Crime and 
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Criminal Procedures); Title 44 (Public Printing and Documents); and Title 50 (War and 
National Defense) responsibilities (Joint Forces Quarterly, 2009). Now four years later 
the recently released DoD Joint Publication 3–12 (Cyberspace Operations), signed on 
February 5, 2013, attempted to capture the overlap in cyber domain authorities with 
greater specificity in its Figure III-1, depicted in Table 5. Combined, Table 5, with those 
authorities created for the protection of national CI/KR, expands the field of research for 
the protection of national CI/KR from cyber-attacks and intrusions greatly as it now also 
includes: Title 32 (National Guard); Title 40 (Public Buildings, Properties, and Works); 
and Title 42 (Public Health and Welfare).  
 
Table 5.   United States Code-Based Authorities (From JP 3–12, 2013, Figure III-1) 
This chapter will address the primary agencies involved categorized by the 
authorities under which they maintain a role in the protection of national CI/KR from 
cyber-attacks and intrusions. 
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A. U.S. CODE TITLE 6 
Title 6 of the U.S. Code is titled Domestic Security and primarily provides the 
statutory authorities governing the DHS. As such, the remainder of this section will look 
at DHS authorities, roles and efforts as they relate to cybersecurity and the protection of 
CI/KR. 
As recently as May 16, 2013, in his opening statement for the hearing on 
“Facilitating Cyber Threat Information Sharing and Partnering with the Private Sector to 
Protect Critical Infrastructure: An Assessment of DHS Capabilities,” Chairman of the 
House of Representative’s Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and 
Security Technologies Patrick Meehan reaffirmed DHS’ mandate, from the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, as the lead in CI protection.  
While our military protects our nation from foreign adversaries, the 
security of our critical infrastructure—our economy, our roads and 
bridges, domestic energy, water and public utility systems—must be a 
collaborative effort between the private sector, and local, state, and federal 
government. We need a civilian agency to facilitate this partnership. And 
that agency is the Department of Homeland Security. (Facilitating Cyber 
Threat Information Sharing and Partnering with the Private Sector to 
Protect Critical Infrastructure: An Assessment of DHS Capabilities, 2013, 
p. 2) 
1. DHS Authority 
DHS originated from the creation of the Office of Homeland Security in the 
Executive Office of the Presidency, via Executive Order No. 13,228 (2001), which was 
tasked with the mission “to develop and coordinate the implementation of a 
comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or 
attacks” (Executive Order No. 13,228, 2001, sec. 2). The authority of the U.S. president 
to perform these reorganizations lay in statutory authority in 5 U.S.C. §901-903. 
a. Homeland Security Act (2002) 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 
(2002) (6 U.S.C. §101–557), as amended by the Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act of 2007, Pub. L. 109–295, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006), established the 
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DHS as an executive department. The DHS was formally established in order to  
“… consolidate all of the domestic agencies responsible for securing America’s borders 
and national infrastructure, most of which is in private hands” (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 428). More specifically, Two key 
statutory authorities of note are provided to DHS in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
with relation to cybersecurity: protect the nation and to provide analysis and warnings to 
non-federal entities with respect to critical information systems [cybersecurity] (6 U.S.C. 
§112; 6 U.S.C. §143). These are covered in more depth later in this chapter. 
b. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (2008) 
Originally classified when released near the end of President George W. 
Bush’s second term, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (HSPD-23) / National 
Security Presidential Directive 54 (NSPD-54) were signed in January 8, 2008. According 
to a 2010 DHS report titled Computer Network Security and Privacy Protection, HSPD-
23/NSPD-54 (titled Cyber Security and Monitoring) formalized the Comprehensive 
National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), which now “… authorizes DHS, together with 
OMB, to establish minimum operational standards for Federal Executive Branch civilian 
networks so that US-CERT can direct the operation and defense of government 
connections to the Internet” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 2). 
Combined, NSPD 54/HSPD 23, in conjunction with CIP authorities under 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, designate the DHS to coordinate the national 
cybersecurity effort in the “… prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration of 
computers, electronic communications systems, electronic communication services, wire 
communication, and electronic communication, including information contained therein, 
to ensure availability, integrity, authenticity, confidentiality, and non-repudiation is 
maintained across cyberspace” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 2). 
2. DHS Existing Role 
As the propensity of U.S. CI/KR are owned by the private sector and state or local 
governments, it has required the establishment of effective partnerships between the 
public and private sectors to protect these cyber-reliant critical assets from a multitude of 
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threats, including terrorists, criminals, and hostile nations (Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 7, 2003; GAO Testimony 11–865T, 2011).  
a. Protect the Nation 
Significant distinction must be given to the word protect, as, per the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (sect. 102, para. f.1), it is “… the primary mission of the 
Department [sic] to protect the American homeland” (6 U.S.C. §112).  
With this ominous mission in mind, at cursory read, the DHS is also 
tasked in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (sect. 101, para. b.1.F) to protect the 
economic security of the U.S., which would grant the DHS the necessary leeway to 
actively pursue entities stealing intellectual property utilizing the cyber domain. A careful 
read, however, shows this to be an incorrect or rather incomplete interpretation of the 
law. What is actually stated is that DHS will “… ensure that the overall economic 
security of the United States is not diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed 
at securing the homeland…” (6 U.S.C. §111, sect. 101, para. b.1.F). Thus, it should be 
understood that DHS has their mandate to protect the U.S., with the additional caveat that 
DHS pursue their mission while not jeopardizing U.S. economic security through 
unsustainable expenditures. While sensible at the time of formation, this subparagraph is 
unnecessary in its current form, but may provide a unique and simple means to 
modernize DHS authority with respect to today’s national vulnerability created through 
the interdependencies in the cyber domain.   
b. Cybersecurity Support to Non-federal Entities  
Additionally, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–296, 116 
Stat. 2135 (2002) directed that DHS shall— 
(1) as appropriate, provide to State and local government entities, and 
upon request to private entities that own or operate critical information 
systems — 
(A) analysis and warnings related to threats to, and vulnerabilities 
of, critical information systems; and 
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(B) in coordination with the Under Secretary for Emergency 
Preparedness and Response, crisis management support in 
response to threats to, or attacks on, critical information systems; 
and 
(2) as appropriate, provide technical assistance, upon request, to the 
private sector and other government entities, in coordination with the 
Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, with respect 
to emergency recovery plans to respond to major failures of critical 
information systems. (6 U.S.C. §143) 
The above is significant as therein lays the basis for DHS to be the federal 
lead for cybersecurity for CI/KR and their primary role as a conduit between federal, 
state, local, and private sector entities. Equally important is that this wording specifically 
covers critical information systems and not just CI/KR, thus expanding their mandate 
beyond isolated CI/KR cybersecurity, but to cybersecurity of all national, state, and local 
critical information systems. This is later reinforced and reiterated in HSPD-7 and the 
NIPP; listed in the DHS responsibilities is the statement that they are responsible for  
“… coordinating national efforts for the security of cyber infrastructure, including 
precursors and indicators of an attack, and understanding those threats in terms of CIKR 
vulnerabilities…” (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, 2003; National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009, para. 2.2.1). 
Given this codependence between provider and consumer, it would seem 
logical that the private sector would work closely with government agencies to harden 
their own CI and protect key resources. The primary issue with this logic is the fact that 
the private sector and government have very different motives. Private sector companies 
primarily exist in our capitalistic economic system with the underlying goal to maximize 
profits for their investors. Government agencies, such as DHS, are essentially tasked with 
the protection of the national instruments of power and the continuity of the quality of 
life standards. Security measures implemented in the private sector, beyond any formal 
regulation, must stand up to a rigorous consideration of return on investment as viewed 
through a risk management lens. Additionally, the private sector may consciously reject 
cybersecurity measures which, by their implementation, would subject their companies to 
additional compliance requirements (e.g., audits and/or external oversight). In light of 
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this apparently disjointed government and private-sector symbiotic relationship, Tikk 
(2010) identifies that the most important steps in securing national cyberspace must first 
be adopted at the domestic level, prior to attempting to leverage key partner nations. 
GAO has designated federal information security as a government-wide high-risk area 
since 1997, and in 2003 expanded it to include cyber CI (GAO 13–187, 2013). 
3. DHS Efforts (aka: “Significant Strides”) 
According to the 2011 report titled Implementing 9/11 Commission 
Recommendations, DHS has made “… significant strides” over the last ten years in 
enhancing the security of the nation’s critical physical and cyber infrastructure (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2011, p. 5).  
Current tools include the National Cybersecurity Protection System, of 
which the EINSTEIN cyber intrusion detection system is a key 
component; the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center, which serves as the nation’s principal hub for organizing cyber 
response efforts; a 2010 landmark agreement between DHS and the 
Department of Defense to align and enhance America’s capabilities to 
protect against threats to critical civilian and military computer systems 
and networks; the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, a 
comprehensive risk management framework for all levels of government, 
private industry, nongovernmental entities and tribal partners; and 
implementation of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards to 
regulate security at high-risk chemical facilities. Additionally, in February 
2011, President Obama announced the Wireless Innovation and 
Infrastructure Initiative to develop and deploy a nationwide, interoperable 
wireless network for public safety. None of these tools existed prior to 
9/11. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011, p. 5) 
The remainder of this section discusses the above significant strides by DHS to 
aid them in their mandate specifically for enhancing the security of critical physical and 
cyber infrastructure as related to the cyber domain. Therefore, this section addresses the 
NIPP; an agreement between DHS and the Department of Defense to align and enhance 
America’s capabilities to protect against threats to critical civilian and military computer 
systems and networks; the creation of 24-hr cybersecurity common operational picture 
via the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC); and the 
National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS). 
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a. Evolution of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
Per the direction provided in HSPD-5 (2003), on March 1, 2004, the then 
newly formed DHS issued their guidance on the presidentially mandated formalization of 
a national emergency response framework, called the National Incident Management 
System. Ever since, DHS struggled to find the proper balance of interagency, state, and 
local interaction with the private sector. The below sub-sections provide some insight 
into the historic efforts of DHS to find this balance. 
The end result is the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, released in 
2009, as a comprehensive risk management framework for all levels of government, 
private industry, nongovernmental entities and tribal partners, which evolved from the 
significant efforts of DHS to find an acceptable means by which to protect disparate 
CI/KR. The below subparagraphs provide some insight into this evolution from other 
national plans. 
(1) National Response Plan (2004).  Although later amended in 
2006 by DHS in response to data following an initial 240-day evaluation period, the 
original National Response Plan (2004) was published in December 2004 in order to 
provide “… a single, comprehensive framework for the management of domestic 
incidents” (National Response Plan, 2004, p. iii). This document is significant due to the 
fact that it also was accompanied by a letter of agreement (LOA) which was then signed 
by 32 federal departments and agencies and other organizations to commit to eight 
specific supporting line items in the implementation of the NRP as put forward by DHS. 
This was tenable primarily since the NRP did not alter the statutory responsibilities nor 
alter the funding of federal, state, local, or tribal departments and agencies and was built 
on existing systems and best practices. The important thing to note from this document 
though is that it tried to implement a single framework solution, regardless of the disaster 
being responded to. Negative feedback from dealing with various events during the 
evaluation period led DHS to revisit and revise their doctrine.  
The NRP, officially implemented April 15, 2005, was designed to 
be the principal operational plan for implementing national incident management by 
detailing the processes and national-level coordinating structures that will be required and 
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used during an INS (National Response Plan, 2004, p. 16). Specifically, the NRP was 
stated to be an “… all-hazard, all-discipline plan…” and was the direct implementation of 
NIMS for events designated as Incidents of National Significance (INS). In a designated 
INS, “… the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with other Federal 
departments and agencies, initiates actions to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from the incident. These actions are taken in conjunction with State, local, tribal, 
nongovernmental, and private-sector entities” (National Response Plan, 2004, p. 15). The 
means of informing the U.S. president are established through a convening body termed 
the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) (National Response Plan, 2004, p. 
22). Clearly explained in the NRP, the IIMG was a “… scalable organization primarily 
comprised of senior-level representatives from DHS, other Federal departments and 
agencies, and NGOs, as required” (National Response Plan, 2004, p. 22). While stood up 
only at the direction of the Secretary of DHS in response to a specific INS, the IIMG 
replaced the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group which served as the policy-level 
multiagency coordination entity under the FRP (National Response Plan, 2004, p. 22). 
The plan distinguishes between national-level incidents that 
require coordination by the DHS, which are termed INS, and the majority of incidents 
that were to be handled through existing emergency authorities and plans by responsible 
jurisdictions and agencies.  
(2) National Response Framework (2008).  Dated January 
2008, the DHS disseminated the initial National Response Framework (NRF) as an 
overture to how the U.S. would respond to any natural or man-made hazard. Officially, 
the NRF superseded the NRP on March 22, 2008 as the plan to respond to national-level 
incidents. Written to capture specific authorities and best practices, the NRF is structured 
to be scalable, flexible, and accommodating of adaptable coordinating structures in order 
to best respond to the specific incident. The document outlines that the structure attempts 
to do this by “… aligning key roles and responsibilities across the Nation [linking all 
levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector] … 
managing incidents that range from the serious but purely local to large-scale terrorist 
attacks or catastrophic natural disasters” (National Response Framework, 2008, p. 1). 
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Although meant to supersede the corresponding sections of the National Response Plan 
(2004, with 2006 revisions), this document itself was transformed from the primary plan 
to a subset of a larger plan three years later in 2011 with the issuance of the National 
Preparedness Goal directed in PPD-8. PPD-8 integrated, and required the update of, the 
NRF as one of five National Preparedness Frameworks of the National Planning System. 
The updated NRF was then released May 2013, as previously discussed in Chapter III, 
para. C.4. 
(3) National Infrastructure Protection Plan (2009).  The 
preponderance of U.S. CI/KR is privately owned and operated, which means ensuring its 
protection and resiliency involves an unprecedented partnership between government and 
the private sector (National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009). This partnership is at 
the heart of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) put forth by the DHS in 
2009, which establishes a unique coordination and information-sharing framework that 
unifies protection of our nation’s CI/KR into an integrated plan. Building from the initial 
CI/KR list provided in PDD-63, DHS divided the responsibilities for CI/KR protection 
into Sector-Specific Agencies (SSA) in the issuance of HSPD-7 (Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 7, 2003) and further refined those responsibilities six years later in 
the NIPP (2009).  
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Table 6.   Critical Infrastructure Sectors and Lead Agencies  
(From GAO-11-865T, 2011, Table 1) 
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b. Bi-lateral DHS-DoD Memorandum of Agreement (2010)  
Signed in September 2010, the DHS and the DoD entered into a 
memorandum of agreement regarding cybersecurity, agreeing to:  
… provide personnel, equipment, and facilities in order to increase 
interdepartmental collaboration in strategic planning for the Nation's 
cybersecurity, mutual support for cybersecurity capabilities development, 
and synchronization of current operational cybersecurity mission 
activities. Implementing this Agreement will focus national cybersecurity 
efforts, increasing the overall capacity and capability of both DHS' 
homeland security and DoD's national security missions, while providing 
integral protection for privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.  
c. Cybersecurity Common Operational Picture 
As an overview, Figure 2 graphically depicts the organizational chart of 
DHS, as retrieved from the DHS Main Page in May 2013. Accentuated in a red box is the 
primary directorate of concern with respect to cyber—Office of the National Protection 
and Programs Directorate (NPPD).  
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Figure 2.  Organizational Chart of the Department of Homeland Security  
(From ICOD: April 2013) 
  70
(1) National Protection & Programs Directorate.  Executive 
Order No. 13,618, signed July 6, 2012, disseminated the roles and responsibilities of 
federal agencies with respect to its title—Assigning National Security and Emergency 
Preparedness Communications Functions. In response, DHS’ National Protection and 
Programs Directorate (NPPD) / Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) 
realigned its office in October 2012 to better meet the required responsibilities set forth in 
the new EO (GAO-13–187, 2013, p. 95). Due to the realignment though, CS&C 
operational elements realigned as well to report directly to the NCCIC. This shift is 
significant as it bound communications and cybersecurity through the functions 
performed by the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications, the Industrial 
Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), and the United States 
Cyber Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) (GAO-13–187, 2013, p. 95). 
The NPPD organizational structure, graphically depicted in Figure 
3, highlights two key departments, accentuated by red box outlines. Combined they 
address CIP from threats originating from cyberspace—CS&C and the Office of 
Infrastructure Protection (IP). Although Figure 3 is from June 2011, the four bottom 
divisions remain valid according to the DHS NPPD web site, as of July 2013. 
 
Figure 3.  DHS/NPPD Organizational Chart (From ICOD, June 2011) 
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Fulfilling their cybersecurity roles, per the August 2012 DHS 
report titled Office of Infrastructure Protection Strategic Plan: 2012–2016, CS&C and IP 
collaboratively “… enhance the integration of analysis, modeling, and assessment tools 
and methodologies to better analyze and understand the impacts on physical 
infrastructure from cyber and control system exploits and develop enhanced risk 
management solutions” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012, p. 8). 
Specifically, CS&C is tasked with assuring the security, resiliency, 
and reliability of the nation’s cyber and communications infrastructure. As a compliment, 
IP leads the coordinated national effort to reduce risk to CI/KR posed by acts of 
terrorism. Together, they increase the nation's level of preparedness and the ability to 
respond and quickly recover in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other 
emergency. Part of their success can be attributed directly to the NCCIC which is aligned 
under CS&C.  
Per the DHS report titled Implementing 9/11 Commission Report 
Recommendations, the NCCIC is a 24-hour, DHS-led coordinated watch and warning 
center to serving as the nation’s principal hub for organizing cyber-response efforts and 
maintaining the national cyber and communications common operational picture (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2011, p. 5).  
d. National Cybersecurity Protection System 
To feed the NCCIC, the Network Security Deployment branch of the 
CS&C employs the NCPS as the DHS’ program of record to provide an “… integrated 
system of intrusion detection, analytics, intrusion prevention, and information sharing 
capabilities that are used to defend the Federal Executive Branch civilian government’s 
IT infrastructure from cyber threats” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012). The 
NCPS, referred to colloquially as EINSTEIN in press briefings, “… consists of the 
hardware, software, supporting processes, training, and services … to support the 
Department's mission requirements as delineated in the CNCI [Comprehensive National 
Cybersecurity Initiative] and mandated in NSPD-54/ HSPD-23” (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2012). 
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(1) EINSTEIN.  EINSTEIN, as an evolving IDS/IPS hybrid, 
provides a wide range of cyber security capabilities designed to “… improve detection, 
prevention, and notification of cyber incidents, improve correlation, aggregation and 
visualization of cybersecurity data, improve information of cybersecurity activity….” on 
government networks (primarily the .gov domain) (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2012). Multiple instances of EINSTEIN are of note.  
 EINSTEIN 1 was originally provided in 2008 as an intrusion 
detection system (IDS) and was key for detecting and logging 
federal civilian Executive Branch agency network traffic for 
analysis using standard IDS protocols of known signature based 
detection (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013, p. 2)  
 EINSTEIN 2 provided additional capabilities by alerting analysts 
and by providing better traffic analysis, while instituting 
customized signature based detection (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2013, p. 3)  
 EINSTEIN 3 Accelerated (E3A) is reported to be more of an 
intrusion protection system (IPS), which by its very nature, and in 
conjunction with internet service providers (ISPs), will be able to 
conduct very specific configuration changes to the systems 
monitored if rule-based criteria are met (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2013, p. 3)  
Per the Oct 31, 2012 DHS briefing to the Data Privacy Integrity 
Advisory Committee, once formally instituted, E3A will provide the following services to 
aid US-CERT and NCCIC: 
 Intrusion detection (passive defense); 
 Intrusion prevention (active defense); 
 Advanced cyber analytics; 
 Data aggregation & correlation; 
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 Visualization; 
 Malware analysis; 
 Packet Capture; 
 Incident Management; and 
 Information sharing and collaboration. 
A noted limitation of the NCPS (EINSTEIN), in any version, is 
that it solely covers the federal civilian Executive Branch agency networks. Although 
useful for a common operational picture of those networks, it is not tied to state, local, or 
private sector systems in order to provide advance warning of probing or attacks, which 
may be indicative of a coordinated attack. It therefore is a useful tool for the NCCIC, but 
limited in value for national defense of CI/KR. 
B. U.S. CODE TITLE 10 
Title 10 of the U.S. Code is titled Armed Forces and primarily provides the 
statutory authorities governing the DoD as a war fighting force. As such, the remainder of 
this section will look at DoD authorities, roles and efforts as they relate to cybersecurity 
and the protection of CI/KR. 
According to the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (2006), 
the U.S. can achieve superiority in cyberspace only if command and control relationships 
are clearly defined and executed. DoD has assigned authorities and responsibilities for 
implementing cyberspace operations among combatant commands, military services, and 
defense agencies; however, the “… supporting relationships necessary to achieve 
command and control of cyberspace operations remain unclear” (GAO Report 11–75, 
2011). What is clear though is that cyberspace operations are increasingly essential to 
defeating the sensors and C2 that underpin an opponent’s capabilities (Greenert, 2011). 
As such, USSTRATCOM, via the Unified Command Plan, is assigned specific 
responsibilities which include planning, synchronizing, advocating, and employing 
capabilities to meet the United States’ strategic deterrence and cyberspace operations 
(Feickert, 2013, p. 20).  
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1. DoD Authorities  
The DoD has both constitutional authority, as delegated by the U.S. president, and 
statutory authorities, as approved by the U.S. Congress. Title 10 created and empowered 
the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) with all the “authority, direction and control” over 
DoD, including subordinate agencies and commands (10 U.S.C. §113, sect. (b)). 
In a personal interview with the DoD Senior Associate Deputy General Counsel 
for Intelligence, Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., on January 15, 2013, Sharp identified four 
primary DoD missions that had adequate authorities relating to cyberspace: (1) homeland 
defense; (2) protecting and defending DoD information systems (including the DIB);  
(3) protecting and defending non-DoD information systems; and (4) emergency support. 
These four mission areas are detailed below, citing the requisite constitutional and/or 
statutory authorities. For the sake of consolidation, however, the protection and defense 
of information system roles have been subordinated under the following section on 
homeland defense. 
a. Homeland Defense 
In 1941, while still in a neutral position before being drawn into WWII, 
U.S. Attorney General Robert Jackson provided the following analysis with respect to the 
U.S. president's military powers:  
Article II, section 2, of the Constitution provides that the President "shall 
be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States." By 
virtue of this constitutional office he has supreme command over the land 
and naval forces of the country and may order them to perform such 
military duties as, in his opinion, are necessary or appropriate for the 
defense of the United States. These powers exist in time of peace as well 
as in time of war. (Yoo, 2001, sect. II) 
As such, U.S. Constitution (Article II, sect. 2), authorizes the U.S. 
president to direct the defense of the Nation as a primary duty. This interpretation was 
later reaffirmed by U.S. Congress in both the “… War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 
93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973), codified at 50 U.S.C. §1541-1548, and in the Joint 
Resolution passed by Congress on September 14, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001)” (Yoo, 2001). Due to the scope of the task, this constitutional authority is 
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delegated via statutory authority to the SECDEF and, subsequently upon presidential 
direction, commanders of combatant commands as the lead, and supported, department 
for national defense (3 U.S.C. §301-303; 10 U.S.C. §113; 50 U.S.C. §401, sect. 2; 10 
U.S.C. §164). 
Under the responsibilities granted through these authorities: appropriately 
measured DoD response to hostile acts or hostile intent, through conventional or non-
conventional means (e.g., offensive cyberspace operations) retain “… clear Constitutional 
authority”; defensive response actions, which are still being developed, (e.g., 
countermeasures) remain “… untested Constitutional authority” (Sharp, 2012, slide 12).  
Defense of the nation, with respect to cybersecurity, can be further broken 
down into protecting and defending both DoD and non-DoD information systems. 
(1) Protect and Defend DoD Information Systems.  While 
retaining the same above authorities from the homeland defense section, with respect to 
the GIG, the DoD is provided with: “… robust statutory authority” to conduct network 
operations (Sharp, 2012, slide 12). 
(2) Protect and Defend Non-DoD Information Systems.  While 
the ability to share or provide technical expertise and information is still evolving, the 
DoD retains “… adequate statutory authority” to do so (Sharp, 2012, slide 12). 
b. Emergency Authorities 
Involvement in a designated national emergency resulting from an INS, as 
solicited by the DHS, does not have clear constitutional basis but does retain some aging 
statutory authority (Sharp, 2012, slide 12). 
While three additional key pieces of legislation leverage DoD assets in 
execution of national objectives — Posse Comitatus Act, Stafford Act, and Economy Act 
— only two have validity with respect to the cyber domain and those capabilities residing 
within DoD to aid in post-INS events. The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to this 
situation in a post-INS cyber-related scenario. Therefore, the remainder of this section 
will briefly describe the authorities provided by the other two acts, and conclude with 
how they relate to cyber protection of CI/KR. 
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(1) Stafford Act.  Augmenting the previous discussion in 
Chapter II, para. C.2.d, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act of 1988 amended the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (Public Law No. 93–288). This 
provides the legal means by which the DoD can support disaster response activities. As 
there are no limitations on the disaster once designated as an INS, it must be assumed that 
this is also inclusive of those involving the cyber domain. This in no way precludes the 
applicable statutory authorities that DoD must operate under. 
(2) Economy Act.  The Economy Act of 1932 (Pub. Law No. 
72–212; 47 Stat. 382), as amended, provides for the reimbursement for goods and 
services of support from one federal agency when requested by a separate federal agency. 
As the requesting agency may not have the federally mandated mission to maintain a 
specific capability or skillset as a means to fulfill their mission, but does knows that the 
requested agency does, the Economy Act of 1932 allows for the utilization of the 
capability on a not to interfere basis with the knowledge that the requesting agency is 
required to monetarily reimburse affected agency. This law minimizes unnecessary 
duplication of capabilities and thus attempts to act a good steward of tax payers’ dollars. 
This law is applicable to cybersecurity in that DoD, through 
USCYBERCOM and the National Security Agency (NSA), maintain unique cyber 
capabilities and access which may be required by either DHS or DOJ in a post-incident 
response involving the cyber domain. 
2. DoD Existing Role  
It is important to note when reviewing the mission and capabilities, that according 
to the OMB FY2013 report of the federal budget for the homeland security mission, the 
DoD receives approximately 26% of total federal homeland security funding, second only 
to that of the DHS itself (OMB, 2013). To have such a significant portion of the budget 
for domestic defense, it would stand to reason that DoD must also have a significant 
mission to perform in justification. The fact is that it does. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) protects the U.S. homeland through 
two distinct but interrelated missions: (1) homeland defense, which 
defends against threats such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, 
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and cyber incidents; and (2) civil support, which involves supporting other 
federal agencies in responding to major domestic disasters, emergencies, 
and special events. (GAO Report 13–128, 2012) 
On October 1, 2002, DoD announced the operational capability of the newly 
established U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), which was created to 
consolidate existing homeland defense and civil support missions that were previously 
executed by other military organizations. Despite this, some of the homeland defense 
mission set falls clearly on U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), even more so 
now that USSTRATCOM has the sub-unified command U.S. Cyber Command 
(USCYBERCOM). 
a. Homeland Defense 
Fully comprehending the enormity of the task assigned and the 
decentralized execution of the cyber vulnerability existing in networks paired with the 
cyber threats that are posed by nation-states and non-nation state actors alike, emphasis 
and visibility on cyber operations increased to the point that a new sub-unified command 
under USSTRATCOM was established on May 21, 2010—USCYBERCOM (Feickert, 
2013, p. 20).  
In preparation, SECDEF guidance dated June 23, 2009, detailed that, as 
delegated by USSTRATCOM, USCYBERCOM would be responsible for executing the 
specified cyberspace missions detailed in Section lS.d.(3) of the Unified Command Plan 
(UCP). These missions are essentially “… to secure our freedom of action in cyberspace 
and mitigate the risks to our national security that come from our dependence on 
cyberspace and the associated threats and vulnerabilities” (Alexander, 2009). 
Being the lead in the proactive defensive role,  DoD implemented 
measures to better address cybersecurity threats to the nation, such as developing new 
organizational structures, first led by the establishment of the USCYBERCOM and 
service specific cyber commands/elements, to facilitate the integration of cyberspace 
operations with a focus on cybersecurity (GAO Report 11–75, 2011). This is important 
as DoD maintained the responsibility to both defend the GIG and the national DIB. 
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(1) Protection of the Global Information Grid.  With the goal 
of protecting the GIG in mind, U.S. Cyber Command recognized that they must 
incorporate integrated defensive and offensive cyberspace operations into all planning 
efforts to span the relevant dimensions of cybersecurity (GAO Brief 11–695R, 2011). 
This gets problematic, as Jensen (2010) states that 98% of all U.S. government 
communications travel over civilian-owned-and-operated networks, making much of this 
intermixed infrastructure legitimate targets under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and 
therefore in need of protection. The current integration of U.S. government assets with 
civilian systems makes segregation impossible and therefore creates a legal responsibility 
for the U.S to protect those civilian networks, services, and communications under 
LOAC (Jensen, 2010). According to Breen and Geltzer (2011), the decentralized 
structure of the Internet itself intensifies the overall threat, as it encourages state and non-
state actors alike to develop and employ cyber warfare capabilities anonymously, making 
deterrence more complicated. 
(2) Protection of the Defense Industrial Base.  Per the CI/KR 
sector assignment to SSAs in the NIPP (2009), DoD developed an annex detailing their 
plan to execute those duties and responsibilities and updated it in 2010 (NIPP Annex—
DIB Security Specific Plan, 2010).  
Although protection can include a wide range of activities from 
improving security protocols, hardening facilities, building resiliency and redundancy, 
initiating active or passive countermeasures, installing security systems, and leveraging 
“… self-healing” technologies, it also includes implementing cybersecurity measures 
(NIPP, 2009). In an effort to define the threats which the measures must be paired to, 
Tikk (2010) has broken cybersecurity down to four relevant dimensions—Internet 
Governance, Cyber Crime, Cyber Terrorism, and Cyber Warfare. So, while even though 
the actual characterization of cyberspace activity remains the subject of much debate in 
the academic and technical realm, the unique nature of the cyber arena clearly calls into 
question traditional state boundaries and operational codes of conduct (Dobitz, Hass, 
Holtje, Jokerst, Ochsner, & Silva, 2008).  
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The task of securing the cyber domain must truly be both a 
national and international one; DoD is uniquely poised to foster greater information 
sharing, with respect to cybersecurity, amongst partner nations (Tikk, 2010). Despite 
somewhat differing national views on cybersecurity priorities, cooperation has proved 
successful among like-minded partners, and there are signs of emerging cyber-coalitions 
although greater coordination will be required to address future threats (Tikk, 2010).  
The DoD, DHS, private sector CI/KR owners/operators and others are improving:  
(1) physical, personal, and cyber security; (2) risk-based investment decision-making; 
and (3) information sharing throughout the DIB sector, forging a foundation by which to 
unify individual goals toward a more transparent cooperative effort (NIPP Annex–DIB 
Security Specific Plan, 2010). In line with holistic view of Tikk (2010), DoD has 
implemented strict information assurance (IA) requirements for their information 
technology systems, not only on federal systems, but strict implementation of standards 
across coalition networks and in the defense industry (NIPP Annex–DoD’s Security 
Specific Plan, 2010). 
b. Civil Support 
The civil support role of the DoD was solidified by Executive Order No, 
12,148 (1979) nearly 35 years ago. In this EO, it states that “… the Secretary of Defense 
shall provide the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency with support 
for civil defense programs in the areas of program development and administration, 
technical support, research, communications, transportation, intelligence, and emergency 
operations” (Executive Order No. 12, 148, 1979, para. 2–205). Additionally, HSPD-8 
(2003) explicitly stated that the DoD will provide the DHS with information describing 
the organizations and functions within the DoD that may be utilized to provide support to 
civil authorities during a domestic crisis (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, 
2003, para. 21). More recently, this concern was addressed in the memorandum of 
agreement between the DHS and the DoD in 2010 and previously described in this 
chapter, para. A.3.b. Despite these efforts, critics and skeptics remain. 
While a 2010 DoD Directive, a 2007 joint publication, and an agreement 
with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provide some details on 
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how DoD should respond to requests for civil support in the event of a 
domestic cyber incident, they do not address some aspects of how DoD 
will provide support during a response. First, DoD has not clarified its 
roles and responsibilities, and chartering directives for DoD’s Offices of 
the Assistant Secretaries for Global Strategic Affairs and for Homeland 
Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs outline conflicting and 
overlapping roles and responsibilities. Second, DoD has not ensured that 
its civil support guidance is aligned with national plans and preparations 
for domestic cyber incidents. (GAO Report 13–128, 2012).  
3. DoD Efforts  
“DoD has issued and updated several key pieces of doctrine, policy, and strategy 
for homeland defense and civil support, but it has not updated its primary Strategy for 
Homeland Defense and Civil Support since it was initially issued in 2005” (GAO Report 
13–128, 2012).  DoD has, however: (1) published an internally deconflicted standardized 
lexicon with respect to cyber; (2) published DoD guidance for the internally standardized 
handling of cyber-incident procedures; and (3) been working through the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense–Policy (OUSD-P) to address an interagency approach to 
national cybersecurity. 
a. Standardized Cyber-Lexicon 
The DoD Joint Publication 3–12 (Cyberspace Operations), signed on 
February 5, 2013, provides the deconflicted acceptable cyber-lexicon for DoD. This 
standardization effort paves the way for future efforts of interagency deconfliction and 
standardization. 
b. Standardized DoD Cyber-Incident Response Procedures 
The Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Manual 6510.01B, titled Cyber 
Incident Handling Program and published on July 10, 2012, details the deconflicted 
cyber incident handling program for DoD. This standardization effort focuses on the DoD 
responsibility to protect DoD information systems and the DIB, as their assigned CI 
sector in the NIPP through the creation and utilization of a Joint Incident Management 
System (Joint Chief of Staff Manual 6510.01B, 2012, encl. F(appx. B)).  
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c. Interagency Cooperation 
From a specific recommendation, originating from the same 2012 GAO 
report, that the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy to work with USSTRATCOM and its subordinate sub unified command 
(USCYBERCOM), DHS, and other relevant stakeholders to update guidance on 
preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents to align with national-level 
guidance, Figure 4 has been generated (GAO Report 13–128, 2012). Colloquially 
referred to as the Bubble Chart, Figure 4 lists and graphically depicts the agreed upon 
responsibilities, shared and individual, of the three primary federal departments 
responsible for national cybersecurity. 
 
Figure 4.  U.S. Federal Cybersecurity National Roles and Responsibilities  
(From ICOD, May 2013) 
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C. U.S. CODE TITLE 18 
Title 18 of the U.S. Code is titled Crimes and Criminal Procedure and primarily 
provides the statutory authorities governing the DOJ. As such, the remainder of this 
section will look at DOJ authorities, roles and efforts as they relate to cybersecurity and 
the protection of CI/KR. 
With regard to criminal activities, the cyber domain is simply an environment 
within which an otherwise already illegal act is executed. So, while not all laws are 
clearly cyber-related, many crimes may be perpetrated utilizing the cyber domain and 
thus require expertise internal or external to properly investigate and document for 
prosecutorial purposes. As the Department of Justice (DOJ) is the lead executive 
department for these federal law enforcement responsibilities, it therefore works 
collaboratively with other executive agencies as the supported executive department of 
the U.S. government in those duties. Be that as it may, the nature of their involvement is 
therefore after an identified crime has occurred and does in no way include prevention, 
although sharing of information may mitigate additional criminal actions.  
Specifically, in violation of U.S. federal laws such as the unauthorized and 
unlawful access, exploitation, or modification of CI/KR-related information and control 
systems, the DOJ is key in evidentiary gathering/control, arrest and prosecution.  
1. DOJ Authorities 
Utilizing their constitutional authority, the U.S. Congress, per the Act to Establish 
the Department of Justice (Pub. Law No. 41-97, 16 Stat. 162 (1870)), established the 
DOJ to exercise control over: (1) all criminal prosecutions; (2) civil suits in which the 
United States maintains an interest; and (3) federal law enforcement. Ultimately vested in 
the U.S. Attorney General via statutory authority (28 U.S.C. §503), the propensity of 
duties have been further delegated internal to the various DOJ departments, as provided 
for via statutory authority (28 U.S.C. §510).  
Key among the statutory authorities is the authority to enforce federal law. As 
such, it assists to provide the scope in which those laws pertaining to cybersecurity are 
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framed. The fundamental cybersecurity related law, which pertains to CI/KR, is the 
Computer and Fraud Abuse Act of 1986. 
a. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 
Due to its fundamental significance to the issue of the legality of cyber-
attacks and intrusions into U.S. information systems, the below is the exact excerpt from 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, as amended and implemented in 18 U.S.C. §1030. 
Having undergone multiple amendments by way of maturation of cybersecurity 
knowledge and practice, the law in its current form covers seven distinct categories of 
illegal access and use of U.S. computer systems. The law states: 
(a) Whoever— 
(1) having knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or 
exceeding authorized access, and by means of such conduct having 
obtained information that has been determined by the United States 
Government pursuant to an Executive order or statute to require protection 
against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign 
relations, or any restricted data, as defined in paragraph y. of section 11 of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with reason to believe that such 
information so obtained could be used to the injury of the United States, or 
to the advantage of any foreign nation willfully communicates, delivers, 
transmits, or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or 
attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, 
delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, 
or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or 
employee of the United States entitled to receive it; 
(2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds 
authorized access, and thereby obtains— 
(A) information contained in a financial record of a financial 
institution, or of a card issuer as defined in section 1602 (n) of title 
15, or contained in a file of a consumer reporting agency on a 
consumer, as such terms are defined in the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.); 
(B) information from any department or agency of the United 
States; or 
(C) information from any protected computer; 
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(3) intentionally, without authorization to access any nonpublic computer 
of a department or agency of the United States, accesses such a computer 
of that department or agency that is exclusively for the use of the 
Government of the United States or, in the case of a computer not 
exclusively for such use, is used by or for the Government of the United 
States and such conduct affects that use by or for the Government of the 
United States; 
(4) knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer 
without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such 
conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless 
the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of 
the computer and the value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-
year period; 
(5) (A) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, 
code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally 
causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; 
(B) intentionally accesses a protected computer without 
authorization, and as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes 
damage; or 
(C) intentionally accesses a protected computer without 
authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage and 
loss. 
(6) knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics (as defined in section 
1029) in any password or similar information through which a computer 
may be accessed without authorization, if— 
(A) such trafficking affects interstate or foreign commerce; or 
(B) such computer is used by or for the Government of the United 
States; 
(7) with intent to extort from any person any money or other thing of 
value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication 
containing any— 
(A) threat to cause damage to a protected computer; 
(B) threat to obtain information from a protected computer without 
authorization or in excess of authorization or to impair the 
confidentiality of information obtained from a protected computer 
without authorization or by exceeding authorized access; or 
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(C) demand or request for money or other thing of value in relation 
to damage to a protected computer, where such damage was 
caused to facilitate the extortion; 
shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section. (18 U.S.C. 
§1030) 
Although not the entirety of 18 U.S.C. §1030, the above nonetheless 
provides some insight into the level of detail with which law enforcement and 
investigative officers must delve to arrest and prosecute individuals suspected of breaking 
into national CI/KR systems. Boiled down to bite-size generalizations, the seven sections 
are:  
(1) Computer espionage; 
(2) Computer trespassing to obtain government or financial 
information; 
(3) Computer trespassing in a government computer; 
(4) Committing fraud with a protected computer; 
(5) Damaging a protected computer (e.g., viruses, worms); 
(6) Trafficking in passwords of a government or commerce computer; 
and 
(7) Threatening to damage a protected computer. 
Overlooking the broad generalizations, of the above categories, the less 
obvious offense is listed in 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(4); intentionally included in the above is 
the topic of fraud. Unauthorized access often is obtained by fraudulent means (e.g., fake 
password reset, fraudulent solicitation) and thus constitutes an illegal act even if actual 
access to the information system utilized a valid username and password which had been 
supplied the authorized access. The July 2013 McAfee report titled The Economic Impact 
of Cybercrime and Cyber Espionage reinforces this concept by stating that cybercrime is  
“… usually based on impersonating individuals to gain access to their financial resources 
or other forms of fraud, such as impersonating an antivirus company in order to persuade 
individuals to pay to have their computers cleaned” (McAfee, 2013, p. 10). 
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2. DOJ Existing Roles 
The DOJ has been granted the ability to issue warrants, make arrests, and conduct 
various law enforcement activities necessary to document justification for either. Toward 
the investigative aspect, while statutory authority authorizes some specific collection 
methods, it stands to reason that the DOJ is not uniquely positioned to have access to all 
of the cyber information or databases needed. Therefore, information sharing between the 
DOJ and other executive departments (e.g., DHS and DoD) becomes necessary.  
In October of 1998, PDD-63 created the National Infrastructure Protection Center 
at the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) with the intent to integrate DoD, FBI, 
Secret Service, Department of Energy, Department of Transportation, intelligence 
community (IC), and private sector representatives to increase information sharing 
among agencies and the private sector. The National Infrastructure Protection Center also 
provided the principal means of facilitating and coordinating the federal government’s 
response to an incident, mitigating attacks, investigating threats and monitoring 
reconstitution efforts.  
While not completely abandoned, interagency coordination in support of a legal 
solution is now directed by HSPD-7 (2003), which directs support of the “… Department 
of Justice and other law enforcement agencies in their continuing missions to investigate 
and prosecute threats to and attacks against cyberspace, to the extent permitted by law” 
(Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, 2003, para. 16).  
As such, some of the critical statutory authorities for DOJ, which enable these 
exchanges and compliment the other executive agencies, are those governing information 
intercept, information sharing, and arrests. 
a. Information Intercept 
There reside two primary categories within information intercept—routine 
and emergency.  
(1) Routine.  Statutory authority authorizes the routine 
intercept role of the DOJ for wire taps, and states that DOJ “… may authorize an 
application to a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant … 
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an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a Federal agency having responsibility for the 
investigation…” (18 U.S.C. §2516). 
Additionally, statutory authority authorizes the routine intercept 
role of the DOJ for use of a pen register or trap and trace, as it authorizes “… the 
installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device anywhere within the United 
States, if … the information likely to be obtained … is relevant to an ongoing criminal 
investigation” (18 U.S.C. §3123). 
(2) Emergency.  Statutory authority authorizes the emergency 
intercept role of the DOJ for wire taps. Specifically, Title 18 states that any investigative 
or law enforcement officer who reasonably determines that:  
(a) an emergency situation exists that involves— 
              (i) immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any 
person, 
             (ii) conspiratorial activities threatening the national security 
interest, or 
             (iii) conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime, that 
requires a wire, oral, or electronic communication to be intercepted before 
an order authorizing such interception can, with due diligence, be 
obtained, and 
(b) there are grounds upon which an order could be entered under this 
chapter to authorize such interception. (18 U.S.C. §2518, para. 7) 
Additionally, statutory authority also authorizes the emergency 
intercept role of the DOJ in the use of a pen register or trap and trace. Specifically, Title 
18 also authorizes any investigative or law enforcement officer, who reasonably 
determines that:  
(1) an emergency situation exists that involves— 
          (A) immediate danger of death or serious bodily injury to any 
person; 
          (B) conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime; 
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          (C) an immediate threat to a national security interest; or 
          (D) an ongoing attack on a protected computer … that constitutes a 
crime punishable by a term of imprisonment greater than one year; 
that requires the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace 
device before an order authorizing such installation and use can, with due 
diligence, be obtained, and 
(2) there are grounds upon which an order could be entered under this 
chapter to authorize such installation and use. (18 U.S.C. §3125, para. (a)) 
b. Information Sharing 
In the first year under the new administration of President George W. 
Bush, the USA Patriot Act of 2001 was passed to broaden statutory authorities in 
response to the horrific acts perpetrated on September 11, 2001 (9/11). This legislation, 
reauthorized in 2005, provided a range of controversial tools to support law enforcement 
capabilities to combat terrorism, including enhancing law enforcement’s electronic 
surveillance capabilities (Cyber Policy Review, 2009).  
(1) DOJ to Government (Voluntary).  The most significant tool 
added in the scope of this document, as it relates to cybersecurity of CI/KR, is the 
amendment of 18 U.S.C. §2517 which allows for information sharing from the DOJ with 
other governmental entities. This statutory authority specifically states that:  
Any investigative or law enforcement officer, or other Federal official in 
carrying out official duties …, who …, has obtained knowledge of the 
contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence 
derived therefrom, may disclose such contents or derivative evidence to 
any appropriate Federal, State, local, or foreign government official to the 
extent that such contents or derivative evidence reveals a threat of actual 
or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power, domestic or international sabotage, domestic or 
international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence gathering activities by 
an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a 
foreign power, within the United States or elsewhere, for the purpose of 
preventing or responding to such a threat. (18 U.S.C. §2517, para. 8) 
(2) Private Sector to Government (Voluntary).  Another tool, 
as it relates to cybersecurity of CI/KR, is found in 18 U.S.C. §2702, which allows for 
information sharing from the private sector with governmental entities. This statutory 
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authority specifically states that a provider of remote computing service or electronic 
communication service to the public may divulge the contents or a record of other 
information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service “… to a 
governmental entity, if the provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving 
danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure without delay 
of communications relating to the emergency…” (18 U.S.C. §2702, para. (b)(8) & 
(c)(8)). 
c. Arrests 
Another key aspect to cybersecurity of CI/KR is the legal resolution 
(colloquially referred to as the legal finish), normally occurring post-event, which can 
only be legally executed by law enforcement and investigative professionals. Pursuant to 
statutory authority granted in 18 U.S.C. §3052, the FBI may “… make arrests without 
warrant for any offense against the United States committed in their presence, or for any 
felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have reasonable grounds to 
believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony” (18 
U.S.C. §3052).  
Many felonies exist that require special attention, but below are a few of 
the key ones related to CI/KR—economic espionage, theft of trade secrets, and 
intellectual property rights. These three remain a key federal concern to CI/KR 
protection, as private sector companies maintain proprietary information, systems and 
protocols in their informational command and control. Competitors, or hostile actors, 
with inside knowledge or access gain more than simply an unfair advantage as they may 
gain dangerous access to how the systems are designed to enforce the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability aspects of those U.S. systems. While the security of the system 
should not be dependent on the design or code being secret, nevertheless, an adversary is 
at a disadvantage if they do not have access to it.  
(1) Economic Espionage (18 U.S.C. §1831).  Per the Economic 
Espionage Act of 1996, “Economic Espionage is (1) whoever knowingly performs 
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targeting or acquisition of trade secrets to (2) knowingly benefit any foreign government, 
foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent” (18 U.S.C. §1831).  
(2) Theft of Trade Secrets (18 U.S.C. §1832).  Much along the 
same lines as economic espionage, the theft of a trade secret with the intent to undermine 
the owner of the trade secret, or profit someone other than the owner of the trade secret, 
may compromise CI/KR as many of the components and protocols used are proprietary. 
(3) Intellectual Property Rights (15 U.S.C. §8101 et seq.).  
Intellectual property rights crimes are covered under Pub. Law No. 109-9, Title I, Sec. 
105; 119 Stat. 222, which was enacted on April 27, 2005.     
3. DOJ Efforts  
DOJ is as active as DHS and DoD on the issue of cybersecurity, but given the 
nature and breadth of their mandate, their notable efforts will be minimized to two for the 
sake of brevity. Those two significant achievements are the update and dissemination of 
DOJ near-term and strategic goals and the creation of a network of like-minded attorneys 
and experts to specifically address cybercrime. 
a. Updated DOJ Strategic Goals 
As of February 2012, U.S. Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. outlined, 
in the foreword of a document titled DOJ Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2012–2016, the 
DOJ priorities over the next 5 years to include the following three strategic goals: 
Goal 1: Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation’s Security 
Consistent with the Rule of Law; 
Goal 2: Prevent Crime, Protect the Rights of the American People, 
and Enforce Federal Law; and 
Goal 3: Ensure and Support the Fair, Impartial, Efficient, and 
Transparent Administration of Justice at the Federal, State, Local, 
Tribal, and International Level. (U.S. Department of Justice, 2012, 
Foreword) 
The first two of the above DOJ goals are directly applicable to 
cybersecurity and the protection of CI/KR as crime and terrorism are the largest concerns. 
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As such, this leads me to the second major DOJ effort, as in response to invasions into, 
and cyber-attacks against, U.S. CI/KR information systems, the DOJ launched a 
nationwide network to better address cyber intrusions and attacks—National Security 
Cyber Specialist (NSCS) network.  
b. National Security Cyber Specialist Network 
The NSCS network, formally created in June 2012, is comprised of nearly 
100 prosecutors from U.S. Attorney’s offices nationwide and cyber experts from DOJ’s 
National Security Division and Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual 
Property Section (CCIPS) (U.S. Department of Justice, 2012). This network is a critical 
part of the department’s efforts to better address cyber intrusions by focusing on the 
utilization of a whole-of-government approach to combating cyber threats to national 
security. In addition, the network is “… forging a variety of private and public sector 
alliances to help prevent such attacks and intrusions” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2012). 
Although numerous legislation exists which govern and guide these 
efforts, the most pertinent and notable piece of cybersecurity legislation is the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, as amended and previously described. 
D. U.S. CODE TITLE 32 
Title 32 of the U.S. Code is titled National Guard and primarily provides the 
statutory authorities governing both the Army National Guard and Air National Guard.  
The Army National Guard and Air National Guard units, governed by Title 32 
statutory authority, are important state and federal resources available for planning, 
preparing, and responding to natural or manmade incidents. This is important as, 
collectively, the National Guard, created via constitutional authorities, have expertise in 
critical areas, some being cybersecurity, recovery and information systems (U.S. 
Constitution, Art. I, sect. 8, cl. 16). Their involvement in federal, state, and local 
exercises aid to bridge a gap in socialization of the importance of, and additional 
resources for, emergency response to CI/KR disasters.  
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It is important to recall that INS will be determined after the occurrence and that 
support for state, local and private entities is only provided: (1) when requested; and (2) 
when required recovery and mitigation efforts exceed the resources and/or capabilities of 
the affected entity. Therefore, through greater exposure, inclusion and exposure of the 
numerous National Guard units, timely requests for assistance are more likely as the 
respective governor may activate elements of the National Guard to support state 
domestic civil support functions and activities. Additionally, “… the state adjutant 
general may assign members of the Guard to assist with state, regional, and Federal civil 
support plans….” if deemed necessary (National Response Framework, 2013, p. 14). 
E. U.S. CODE TITLE 40 
Title 40 of the U.S. Code is titled Public Buildings, Properties and Works and 
primarily provides two key statutory authorities of note with respect to CI/KR: (1) the 
governance of information technology procurement; and (2) law enforcement.  
1. Information Technology Procurement 
Simply put, 40 U.S.C. §11314, describes the statutory authorities that exist by 
which the head of each executive agency is permitted to acquire information technology 
independently. As each executive agency head is required to maintain their respective 
agency material readiness, this is especially applicable to the CI/KR discussion as the 
significant disparity of systems creates stovepipes and inadvertent barriers in interagency 
cooperation.  
2. Law Enforcement 
On a divergent topic, Title 40 specifically provides statutory authority for the 
DHS to designate employees to exercise a law enforcement role, in the role of physical 
protection of federal property, personnel on the property, and personnel exercising lawful 
duties in the proximity of the property (40 U.S.C. §1315). This will appear off topic, until 
it is considered that cybersecurity threats also include both an insider access threat vector 
as well as that of industrial and/or national espionage. In either case, discovery would 
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mandate the lawful response of a trained physical security force and, through Title 40, 
this makes it legal.  
F. U.S. CODE TITLE 42 
 Title 42 of the U.S. Code is titled Public Health and Welfare and primarily 
provides the national policy with respect to the protection of CI/KR, as enacted by the 
Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 as quoted at the beginning of this chapter. 
(42 U.S.C. 5195c, sect. c(1)). 
G. U.S. CODE TITLE 44  
Title 44 of the U.S. Code is titled Public Printing and Documents and primarily 
provides the statutory authorities governing information resources management of all the 
executive agencies, specifically including federal information policies.  
Protecting federal government information systems is the topic of 44 U.S.C., 
Chapter 35. As alluded to in the preceding section, the head of each executive agency is 
required to execute their respective “… agency's information resources management 
activities to improve agency productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness” (44 U.S.C. 
§3506). This statutory authority also requires the head of each executive agency to 
designate a Chief Information Officer, whom is responsible, with respect to federal 
information technology, to: 
(1) implement and enforce applicable Government-wide and agency      
information technology management policies, principles, standards, and 
guidelines:  
(2) assume responsibility and accountability for information technology 
investments;  
(3) promote the use of information technology by the agency to improve 
the productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness of agency programs, 
including the reduction of information collection burdens on the public 
and improved dissemination of public information;  
(4) propose changes in legislation, regulations, and agency procedures to 
improve information technology practices, including changes that improve 
the ability of the agency to use technology to reduce burden; and  
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(5) assume responsibility for maximizing the value and assessing and 
managing the risks of major information systems initiatives. (44 U.S.C. 
§3506) 
This responsibility inherently includes the adherence to cybersecurity standards to 
maximize information security, federal policy adherence and departmental policy 
generation.  
Although many of the executive agencies do not have direct control over their 
allocated CI/KR sectors, as designated in the NIPP, DoD utilizes some of their statutory 
authorities granted by both Title 40 (e.g., contract management) and Title 44 (e.g., CIO 
prescription of information systems requirements) in requiring the DIB’s compliance to 
several key cybersecurity best practices.    
It should be noted that the U.S. Congress proposed a bill as recent as 2010 titled 
Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010 (Senate Report No. 111-368), 
which would have increased the information sharing between executive agency 
information systems for the purpose of increasing joint situational awareness. The bill 
never passed and Title 44 was not amended. 
H. U.S. CODE TITLE 50 
Title 50 of the U.S. Code is titled War and National Defense but essentially 
covers intelligence collection, intelligence activities, and covert action (Wall, 2012, p. 
87). As such, Title 50 primarily provides the statutory authorities governing the formation 
of the National Security Council and their respective duties to advise the U.S. president 
with respect to the integrated and efficient activities of the U.S. government in national 
defense (50 U.S.C. §402, sect. a). As the title suggests, the National Security Council is 
the overall national coordinating body responsible for the integration between the 
disparate federal agencies to: 
(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the 
United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the 
interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations 
to the President in connection therewith; and 
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(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments 
and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and 
to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith. (50 
U.S.C. §402, sect. b) 
Specific to the focus of Title 50, and to assist in this endeavor, it also creates the 
national position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to prioritize, coordinate 
and deconflict national intelligence collection and dissemination efforts of the IC (50 
U.S.C. §403-1). Although the IC is broad in their various mandates, not all of the twelve 
categories listed by the National Security Act of 1947, as codified in 50 U.S.C. §401(a), 
have a direct mission with respect to national cybersecurity and protection of CI/KR. 
Therefore, the remainder of this section will look at these authorities, roles and efforts as 
they relate to cybersecurity and the protection of CI/KR. As such, this discussion will 
focus on the National Security Agency (NSA) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
1. National Security Agency 
The National Security Agency (NSA) performs electronic surveillance to 
collect foreign intelligence information for the military and policymakers. 
[…] NSA’s electronic surveillance activities are subject to strict regulation 
by statute and Executive Order due to the potential intrusiveness and the 
implications for the privacy of U.S. persons of these activities. NSA’s 
electronic surveillance activities are also subject to oversight from 
multiple bodies within all three branches of the government. These 
safeguards have ensured that NSA is operating within its legal authority. 
(Congressional Record, 2000)  
a. NSA Authorities 
Definitively citing the exact congressional statutory authorities of the 
NSA, beyond personnel and training management, is relatively difficult. Pursuant to Title 
50 (Chapter 47), as authorized by the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (Public Law 
86–36; 73 Stat. 63; approved May 29, 1959) and amended through Public Law 112–87 
(Enacted January 3, 2012), U.S.C. provides that “…nothing in this chapter or any other 
law … shall be construed to require the disclosure of the organization or any function of 
the National Security Agency…” (50 U.S.C. §3605). Better fidelity of the NSA 
responsibilities is possible though through Executive Order No. 12,333 and the 
declassified version of NSD-42. The next section, which addresses roles, will provide 
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better insight into those. What is clear from the U.S.C. is that NSA has been given 
primacy for signals intelligence (SIGINT) and is responsible to both the Secretary of 
Defense and the Director of National Intelligence (50 U.S.C. §403-5, sect. a(1)). 
Additional statutory authorities granted for execution of their support to cybersecurity as 
it relates to national CI/KR include both law enforcement role and law enforcement 
support roles. 
(1) Law Enforcement.  Odd to not foresee, but Title 50 also 
grants NSA employees with some limited law enforcement authorities in line with those 
granted to DHS employees in Title 40. As such, NSA employees may be designated to 
exercise a physical security force by using these authorities: 
(A) at the National Security Agency Headquarters complex and at any 
facilities and protected property which are solely under the administration 
and control of, or are used exclusively by, the National Security Agency; 
and  
(B) in the streets, sidewalks, and the open areas within the zone beginning 
at the outside boundary of such facilities or protected property and 
extending outward 500 feet. (50 U.S.C. §3609, sect. a) 
Modeled after those authorities granted in Title 40 to the DHS 
personnel, this statutory authority provides a physical defense-in-depth. These statutory 
authorities are essential as the NSA retains the offensive cyber capabilities, which can be 
used to disrupt ongoing attacks on the national CI/KR or as a deterrent for additional 
cyber-attacks or incursions. 
(2) Law Enforcement Support.  Title 50 also grants statutory 
authority for the NSA to, “… upon the request of a United States law enforcement 
agency, collect information outside the United States about individuals who are not 
United States persons … to use the information collected for purposes of a law 
enforcement investigation or counterintelligence investigation” (50 U.S.C. §403-5a, sect. 
a). 
b. NSA Role 
Although not statutory authority, Executive Order No. 13,470 (signed July 
30, 2008), titled Further Amendments to Executive Order 12333, United States 
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Intelligence Activities, amends Executive Order No. 12,333 (December 4, 1981) and 
sheds some light on the expectation levied on NSA by updating intelligence collection 
roles of national intelligence agencies. The amended EO states that the NSA shall: 
1)  Collect (including through clandestine means), process, 
analyze, produce, and disseminate signals intelligence information 
and data for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes 
to support national and departmental missions; 
(2)  Establish and operate an effective unified organization for 
signals intelligence activities, except for the delegation of 
operational control over certain operations that are conducted 
through other elements of the Intelligence Community.  No other 
department or agency may engage in signals intelligence activities 
except pursuant to a delegation by the Secretary of Defense, after 
coordination with the Director [DNI]; 
(3)  Control signals intelligence collection and processing 
activities, including assignment of resources to an appropriate 
agent for such periods and tasks as required for the direct support 
of military commanders; 
(4)  Conduct administrative and technical support activities within 
and outside the United States as necessary for cover arrangements; 
(5)  Provide signals intelligence support for national and 
departmental requirements and for the conduct of military 
operations; 
(6)  Act as the National Manager for National Security Systems as 
established in law and policy, and in this capacity be responsible to 
the Secretary of Defense and to the Director [DNI]; 
(7)  Prescribe, consistent with section 102A(g) of the Act, within 
its field of authorized operations, security regulations covering 
operating practices, including the transmission, handling, and 
distribution of signals intelligence and communications security 
material within and among the elements under control of the 
Director of the National Security Agency, and exercise the 
necessary supervisory control to ensure compliance with the 
regulations; and 
(8)  Conduct foreign cryptologic liaison relationships in 
accordance with sections 1.3(b)(4), 1.7(a)(6), and 1.10(i) of this 
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order. (Executive Order No. 12,333, as amended 2008, para. 
1.7(c)) 
This EO, even through multiple amendments, reaffirms with significant 
evidence that NSA is the primary agency in charge of SIGINT. What is not clear is the 
extent that SIGINT differs from cyber intelligence, as the root document (NSD-42) 
essentially predates extensive maturation of the cyber domain.  
Declassified in 1996, NSD-42 (signed July, 5, 1990) states that NSA is the 
national manager for “National Security Systems” and is responsible to: 
a. Examine U.S. Government national security systems and 
evaluate their vulnerability to foreign interception and exploitation. 
Any such activities, including those involving monitoring of 
official telecommunications, shall be conducted in strict 
compliance with law, Executive Order and implementing 
procedures, and applicable Presidential directive. No monitoring 
shall be performed without advising the heads of the agencies, 
departments, or services concerned; 
b. Act as the U.S. Government focal point for cryptography, 
telecommunications systems security, and information systems 
security for national security systems; 
c. Conduct, approve, or endorse research and development of 
techniques and equipment to secure national security systems; 
d. Review and approve all standards, techniques, systems, and 
equipment related to the security of national security systems; 
e. Conduct foreign computer security and communications security 
liaison, including entering into agreements with foreign 
governments and with international and private organizations 
regarding national security systems, except for those foreign 
intelligence relationships conducted for intelligence purposes by 
the Director of Central Intelligence. Any such agreements shall be 
coordinated with affected departments and agencies; 
f. Operate such printing and fabrication facilities as may be 
required to perform critical functions related to the provisions of 
cryptographic and other technical security material or services; 
g. Assess the overall security posture of and disseminate 
information on threats to and vulnerabilities of national security 
systems; 
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h. Operate a central technical center to evaluate and certify the 
security of national security telecommunications and information 
systems;  
i. Prescribe the minimum standards, methods and procedures for 
protecting cryptographic and other technical security material, 
techniques, and information related to national security systems; 
j. Review and assess annually the national security 
telecommunications systems security programs and budgets of 
Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and 
recommend alternatives, where appropriate, for the Executive 
Agent; 
k. Review annually the aggregated national security information 
systems security program and budget recommendations of the 
Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government for 
the Executive Agent; 
l. Request from the heads of Executive departments and agencies 
such information and technical support as may be needed to 
discharge the responsibilities assigned herein; 
m. Coordinate with the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology in accordance with the provisions of the Computer 
Security Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-235); and 
n. Enter into agreements for the procurement of technical-security 
material and other equipment, and their provision to Executive 
departments and agencies, where appropriate, to government 
contractors, and foreign governments. (NSD-42, 1990, para. 7) 
Beyond the simple title designation, the above clearly reiterated numerous 
times are the various duties associated with protection of national security systems. This 
makes the defense of national security systems plainly in the realm of NSA’s mandate. 
By maintaining this cyber capability, it also allows the DHS to utilize those same 
services, when needed in response to a CI/KR cyber-attack or intrusion, per the Economy 
Act of 1932 (Pub. Law No. 72–212; 47 Stat. 382) and Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (Public 
Law No. 93–288), as amended by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act of 1988.  
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c. NSA Efforts 
The NSA maintains relative confidentiality on its capabilities and thus this 
section is truncated due to classification restrictions. This should not be a surprise, as 
initially noted in the Limitations section of Chapter 1, due to the highly classified nature 
of the cyber capabilities, little in the way of capabilities will be delved into in an effort to 
keep the propensity of this thesis at the lowest level of classification possible. As such, it 
will be grossly assumed that DoD, and by subordination NSA, by the very nature of 
training, billets, commands, and funding has the necessary means to employ and/or build 
the requisite capabilities needed to exercise its authorities in the cyber domain.  
What is important to note is that the NSA, as a subordinate agency to the 
DoD, has been the site of colocation and dual hatting of the commander of DoD’s 
USCYBERCOM. What this enables is a breadth of operational capability with a growing 
organization trying to build those capabilities for offensive use. Although significant 
public discussion continues with regard to the validity of the pairing, it nonetheless is the 
reality at the time of this thesis. It is also important to note that each has differing 
statutory authorities, but are positioned for synergistic efforts when needed. 
2. Central Intelligence Agency 
The CIA plays an integral role in the protection of national CI/KR in a limited 
sense. Due to their mandate, they have no internal security functions and therefore have 
no legal enforcement powers domestically. As such, their direction, deconfliction, and 
use of human intelligence (HUMINT) sources is essential in gaining access to personnel 
or networks, which need to be exploited for valuable information and intelligence and 
would otherwise be inaccessible. 
a. CIA Authorities  
Pursuant to Title 50, the CIA has the responsibility to: 
(1) collect intelligence through human sources and by other 
appropriate means, except that the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or law 
enforcement powers or internal security functions;  
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(2) correlate and evaluate intelligence related to the national 
security and provide appropriate dissemination of such 
intelligence;  
(3) provide overall direction for and coordination of the collection 
of national intelligence outside the United States through human 
sources by elements of the intelligence community authorized to 
undertake such collection and, in coordination with other 
departments, agencies, or elements of the United States 
Government which are authorized to undertake such collection, 
ensure that the most effective use is made of resources and that 
appropriate account is taken of the risks to the United States and 
those involved in such collection; and  
(4) perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence 
affecting the national security as the President or the Director of 
National Intelligence may direct. (50 U.S.C. §403–4a, sect. d) 
This is significant as it establishes the CIA as the primary agency with 
statutory authority for HUMINT, as well as assigning it analytical functions. Primarily 
due to the above clause negating internal security functions, much of the intelligence 
collection of the CIA is directly governed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978 (50 U.S.C. §1801 et seq.). 
b. CIA Role 
Executive Order 13,470 (July 30, 2008) amended Executive Order 12,333 
(December 4, 1981) to include the responsibilities of the CIA. The amended EO states 
that the CIA shall: 
    (1) Collect (including through clandestine means), analyze, produce, 
and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence; 
    (2) Conduct counterintelligence activities without assuming or 
performing any internal security functions within the United States; 
    (3)  Conduct administrative and technical support activities within and 
outside the United States as necessary for cover and proprietary 
arrangements; 
    (4)  Conduct covert action activities approved by the President.  No 
agency except the Central Intelligence Agency (or the Armed Forces of 
the United States in time of war declared by the Congress or during any 
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period covered by a report from the President to the Congress consistent 
with the War Powers Resolution, Public Law 93‑148) may conduct any 
covert action activity unless the President determines that another agency 
is more likely to achieve a particular objective; 
    (5)  Conduct foreign intelligence liaison relationships with intelligence 
or security services of foreign governments or international organizations 
consistent with section 1.3(b)(4) of this order; 
    (6)  Under the direction and guidance of the Director [DNI], and in 
accordance with section 1.3(b)(4) of this order, coordinate the 
implementation of intelligence and counterintelligence relationships 
between elements of the Intelligence Community and the intelligence or 
security services of foreign governments or international organizations; 
and 
    (7)  Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence as 
the Director [DNI] may direct. (Executive Order No. 12,333, as amended 
2008, para. 1.7(a)) 
c. CIA Efforts 
The CIA also maintains relative confidentiality on its capabilities and thus 
this section is truncated due to classification restrictions. What is important to note is that 
their capabilities may be leveraged by other agencies when deemed operationally 
necessary and as deconflicted by the DNI.  
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has undoubtedly been the most difficult to compile due to the various 
competing sources available and attempts to restrict the discussion to that involving 
authorities, roles, and efforts with respect to cybersecurity of CI/KR. It has outlined the 
majority of authorities as provided in the U.S. Constitution and U.S. Code for each of the 
respective major areas involving the cybersecurity of national CI/KR. Below is the 
analysis of organizations and/or agencies identified above, with respect to the required 
authorities to carry out their respective roles in achieving the National Preparedness Goal.  
What this chapter has failed to do is show significant synergy between the 
involved executive agencies and private sector in order to proactively mitigate national 
CI/KR incidents from a cybersecurity standpoint. The bi-lateral agreement between the 
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DHS and DoD represents an exception to this overall trend. As the effort extends beyond 
simply two executive agencies, this highlights a deficiency. Beyond the recently 
generated OUSD-P Bubble Chart of the U.S. Federal Cybersecurity Operations Team 
(Figure 4), which is a graphic depiction of notional roles and responsibilities, the lines are 
still blurred or in need of updating. This regresses back to the much anticipated National 
Protection Framework and the expectation that it will better define those roles and 
responsibilities as worked on by the various representatives of those executive agencies. 
As this will be addressed in the following chapter, below is the analysis of the authorities 
from each section provided in this chapter. 
1. DHS 
The authorities aligned under the DHS are reactionary in nature and thus assume a 
response and recovery role post INS designation.  
This approach, predicated from the fact that the DHS is an executive agency 
created of consolidated authorities to primarily address the response to domestic 
terrorism, assumes that the U.S. will continue to focus on post-event triage and 
coordination vice pre-event mitigation. Without a revision of these authorities and 
mandates for the DHS, it is clear that the federal government of the U.S. is missing an 
opportunity to assist the private sector in the common cause of protecting the national 
CI/KR.  
As such, this continues to discount the importance of the indicators that the 
private sector and various federal agencies could provide in advance to an attack on 
national CI/KR. Although information sharing can be accomplished (often in sanitized 
form) from the federal government via the DHS NCCIC (utilizing statutory authorities as 
provided via the Homeland Security Act of 2002), there are insufficient laws in place to 
protect private sector liability issues for sharing their indications and warnings 
proactively and thereby aid to paint a larger picture of the national cybersecurity posture 
for CI/KR. 
To further complicate this, although authorized to share the indications and 
warnings (e.g., NSA via SIGINT, CIA via HUMINT, DoD by nature of protecting the 
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GIG/DIB, or FBI by means of an ongoing investigation) of a significant malicious event 
being planned for future execution, there apparently is no mandated requirement to. 
Without the clear knowledge that lives are in danger, the concern is that information 
sharing is still restrictive as each agency is likely to protect their various intelligence 
sources and methods and are in no way are compelled to share the information if 
imminence or credibility are less than certain. This highlights a limiting factor of the 
DHS mandate to protect the nation, as their analysis will only be as good as the 
information provided by which to analyze.  
Further highlighting this deficiency, written testimony of NPPD Office of 
Cybersecurity & Communications Acting Assistant Secretary Roberta Stempfley, and 
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center Director Larry Zelvin for 
a House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, 
Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies hearing documents titled Facilitating 
Cyber Threat Information Sharing and Partnering with the Private Sector to Protect 
Critical Infrastructure: An Assessment of DHS Capabilities states: 
… The U.S. national strategy for responding to cyber threats to CI/KR is 
deficient because it lacks provisions for the federal government to 
immediately (1) assess current or cascading damage to CI/KR and (2) 
assess corresponding needs of essential services for affected victims, when 
needs outweigh the resources of the state, local, and private voluntary 
community. Moreover, the U.S. national strategy—encompassing 30(+) 
different agencies—does not promote adequate preparedness when there is 
advance warning of a disaster because preparatory activities are not 
explicitly authorized until the President has issued a disaster declaration. 
(Facilitating Cyber Threat Information Sharing and Partnering with the 
Private Sector to Protect Critical Infrastructure: An Assessment of DHS 
Capabilities, 2013) 
Therefore, although DHS is working to establish situational awareness by 
building the common operational picture (COP) for the federal civilian agencies, it will 
eventually need to be blended with the DoD operational picture of the GIG and DIB, as 
well as allowing for expansion for public and private sector participation/feeds, if a 
whole-of-nation approach is ever to be achieved. Therefore, instead of creating a COP 
that would be technologically unviable to connect with, through the evolving standards of 
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the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), it stands to reason that we 
could leverage the NIST’s significant expertise to work the issue on our behalf. This idea 
is not entirely original, as a congressional hearing on the “Oversight of Executive Order 
13636 and Development of the Cybersecurity Framework” was held on July 18, 2013 and 
the idea of allowing NIST to propose the national cybersecurity framework was 
reinforced by Dr. Eric A. Fischer, Senior Specialist in Science and Technology for the 
Congressional Research Service. As this recommendation already appears to be fielded 
for action and oversight, mentioning it as a recommendation in this thesis is unnecessary. 
As such, I applaud that idea has already been socialized, by leveraging the subject matter 
experts of their respective fields to study and propose viable solutions which are palatable 
and easily understood by the private and public sector companies concerned, as it appears 
to be the smartest way to proceed.  
2. DoD 
Sufficient authorities exist in Title 10 for the DoD to execute its intended mission 
of defending the nation when an aggressor is identified.  
3. DOJ 
Sufficient authorities exist in Title 18 for the DOJ to enforce, and investigate 
violations of, federal laws. Expansion and/or clarification of those laws, however, will 
continue to be necessary as societal and international norms highlight deficiencies in 
current protection. Current failure of U.S. law to adequately provide liability protection 
for private sector companies impedes the national efforts. This oversight precludes timely 
information being provided to the federal government, ideally through the NCCIC, in 
order to meet the goal stated in the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001. 
4. National Guard 
Sufficient authorities exist in Title 32 for the National Guard to execute its 
intended mission of planning, preparing, and responding to natural or manmade incidents 
at the state and federal level. This is a force of augmentation for the response and 
recovery mission areas of the National Planning System. 
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5. Public Building, Properties and Works 
Sufficient authorities exist in Title 40 for the safeguarding of public buildings, 
properties and works. With respect to the information procurement though, there exists 
and opportunity to reduce the number of dissimilar devices employed. Although possibly 
to be resolved in acquisition reform and not exactly Title 40, standardization of 
information systems in the federal agencies would have pros and cons. Although it would 
likely create a monopoly for the chosen providers and singular target for hostile entities, 
it would also minimize the sheer number of differing edge devices requiring management 
and patching, thereby reducing the cybersecurity burden.  
6. National Policy for CI/KR Protection 
Sufficient authorities exist in Title 42 for clarification of the current national 
policy with respect to response and recovery from cyber-attacks or intrusions into 
national CI/KR. What is lacking is the coordination with the national intent to minimize 
unnecessary damage by proactively addressing the prevention, protection, and mitigation 
aspects as outlined in PPD-8. 
7. Public Printing and Documents 
Sufficient authorities exist in Title 44 for the executive agencies to designate a 
CIO, whom enforces mandated federal information policies contained therein. Statutory 
authorities should be revisited, however, with the failed Protecting Cyberspace as a 
National Asset Act of 2010 (Senate Report No. 111-368) as a template to increase 
justification of the E3A upgrade by the Network Security Deployment branch of the DHS 
NPPD. 
8. Intelligence Community 
Sufficient authorities exist in Title 50 for the executive agencies to support 
cybersecurity protection of national CI/KR through intelligence collection, activities and 
covert action.  
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As it stands given the existing U.S. Code, the authorities and roles are appropriate 
to achieve a whole-of-nation approach to response and recovery from a cyber-attack on 
our national CI/KR. The perceived intent, however, is that effective national 








What I have found are areas for improvement, but no silver bullets that would 
specifically support that a unity of command approach would be a significantly better 
approach to protecting our nation’s CI/KR from cybersecurity threats. While involving 
multiple agencies in the unity of effort approach unquestioningly creates bureaucratic 
delay in execution, the unity of effort currently appears to be a necessary evil, as no 
single agency has the authority, or mandate, to handle all aspects of the active and 
passive responsibilities involved in protecting the nation’s CI/KR. This comes at a point 
in time when serious concerns are being raised as to the alleged privacy abuses of federal 
agencies entrusted with our protection (e.g., warrantless wiretapping by the NSA) 
(Landau, 2013, p. 56). This point, combined with the significant reluctance of the U.S. 
public to set aside previously disclosed federal abuses of civil rights and privacy, 
significantly reaffirms the current unity of effort approach. 
A. ANALYSIS 
Documented previously, efforts of the last three U.S. presidents (from 1996 to 
present) to address protecting national CI from cyber threats seem circular in nature as 
each new presidential administration in the last 17 years: (1) identifies a critical 
vulnerability in the national defense of critical infrastructure, (2) creates a committee of 
experts and insiders to research and evaluate issues, and then (3) implements a 
personalized unity of effort strategy.  
 DHS currently has the assigned responsibility to protect the nation and provide 
analysis, warning, and technical support to critical infrastructure, which equates to being 
the lead for centralized planning of the decentralized execution of the security of 
cyberspace of the nation (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, 2003). The cyber-
role of DoD centers on defending the GIG and DIB, providing signatures of cyber threats 
gained by classified means, and support to DHS efforts upon request to provide 
intelligence and attribution support. To fill these roles, in the last four years, DoD has 
made progress by establishing U.S. Cyber Command and service-specific cyber 
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commands/elements (GAO Testimony 11–865T, 2011). Additionally, as recently as the 
past year, DoD has begun to standardize and define key terminology and recognized the 
need to develop and update cyber-related joint doctrine, possibly through the 
development and publication of a single cyberspace operations joint doctrine publication 
(GAO Report 11–75, 2011). As such, these efforts highlight the utility of the various 
federal agencies and their dedication to the unity of effort approach. These efforts are 
laudable but gaps remain between the stated intent contained within policy and execution.  
1. Identified Gaps 
There are sufficient authorities in place to execute a federal response to the 
violation of national integrity of information systems connected to and controlling U.S. 
CI/KR, as executed through the cyber operational domain. What seems to be lacking is 
the updated national guidance with sufficient authorities and laws to prevent, protect 
against and mitigate unnecessary damage to national CI/KR from cyber-attacks in the 
first place.  
a. Documents 
Despite not being able to read every single document produced or released 
on the topics of cybersecurity or critical infrastructure protection, I have been able to 
identify some issues with existing documentation. 
(1) Title 42.  The Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 
2001 states that the official U.S. policy is that “… any physical or virtual disruption of 
the operation of the critical infrastructures of the United States be rare, brief, 
geographically limited in effect, manageable, and minimally detrimental to the economy, 
human and government services, and national security of the United States” (42 U.S.C. 
5195c, sect. c(1)). This is a reactionary policy with embedded goals for CI/KR protection 
criteria. Unfortunately, this codified U.S. policy is at odds with the decade newer 
guidance released as the National Preparedness Goal, directed by PPD-8: “A secure and 
resilient nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, 
protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose 
the greatest risk” (National Preparedness Goal, 2011, p. 1). The disparity lies in that Title 
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42 addresses and focuses solely on post-event criterion, whereas the national 
preparedness goal covers a broader spectrum of preparedness which incorporates 
prevention and protection, preemptive of an INS. Therefore, Title 42 of U.S. Code needs 
to be updated to match the current CI/KR protection policy. 
(2) Lexicon Standardization.  Although the CIP policy still 
comes from the older U.S. Code, the genesis of the current national strategy to protect 
U.S. CI/KR comes from the guidance in PPD-8, National Preparedness Goal, and 
National Planning System. These documents do one key thing of note. PPD-8 calls for an 
all-of-nation approach (implementation of the unity of effort concept), utilizing the 
greater inclusivity implied by the term to highlight the contributions necessary by the 
private and public sectors to reach the collective end-state. This is a clear deviation from 
previous documents, which call for a whole-of-government or federal approach. These 
other terms previously, and likely unwittingly, discounted the private and public sector 
contributions required to be effective, even after frequently including them in documents. 
Although editing every historic document to standardize the lexicon is unwise, as 
documents are renewed, reviewed and/or updated, they should make every attempt to use 
the terms uniformly. 
(3) Revise SNRA Threshold Criteria.  Additionally, addressed 
in the SNRA mandated by the National Preparedness System, identification of the cyber-
attack threshold is useful but precluded by the difficulty in definitively calculating 
monetarily defined effects post cyber-attack, in order to assess the damage in relation to 
the significant thresholds to meet the national-level event criteria.  
(4) National Protection Framework.  The National Planning 
System is still a work in progress as it attempts to address the mandates set forth in PPD-
8; the DHS is still attempting to produce, deconflict, and disseminate all five 
interdependent national planning frameworks. The specific delay, however, in the 
National Protection Framework has created a void in known roles and responsibilities for 
the core capability of cybersecurity, which must be rectified quickly. Without the stated 
guidance that this document is anticipated to provide from the national level, the direct 
justification for many of the U.S. cybersecurity efforts is lacking. Prior to its approval 
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and dissemination by the DHS though, it needs to be socialized with the respective 
executive agencies representatives, whom have already been deconflicting roles and 
responsibilities for the federal cybersecurity mission (e.g., OUSD-P Cyber). Regardless, 
this continued delay is directly incongruent with President Obama’s guidance provided 
over four years ago on May 29, 2009 in which he stated: 
From now on, our digital infrastructure—the networks and computers we 
depend on every day—will be treated as they should be: as a strategic 
national asset. Protecting this infrastructure will be a national security 
priority. We will ensure that these networks are secure, trustworthy and 
resilient. We will deter, prevent, detect, and defend against attacks and 
recover quickly from any disruptions or damage. (Obama, 2009, p. 4) 
This sub-section arguably could have also been in the following 
responsibilities section, but as the document itself is missing and unavailable for review, 
it has been placed in initially in the document section, with additional comments in the 
responsibility section. Without reviewing the document, there is no constructive 
commentary to be provided to assist in its completion. 
b. Responsibilities 
The National Protection Framework, as a subcategory of the National 
Planning System, is the primary national document that is supposed to provide a “… 
detailed concept of operations; a description of critical tasks and responsibilities; detailed 
resource, personnel, and sourcing requirements; and specific provisions for the delivery 
of capabilities … by the Federal Government” (National Preparedness System, 2011, 
p. 4). Due to its previously noted absence, the attempted research on nationally dictated 
responsibilities with respect to CI/KR was essentially null and void as the majority of 
findings will need to be immediately reassessed against the National Protection 
Framework as soon as it is released. An exception to this lack of national responsibilities 
comes from the designation of the DHS as the cybersecurity lead, which requires a 
degree of situational awareness. 
(1) Cybersecurity Situational Awareness.  Without guidance of 
the National Planning System, the DHS is obligated, via the expectation to implement the 
National Preparedness Goal, to prevent, protect against, and mitigate threats to the 
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otherwise secure and resilient national CI/KR (as the lead for both cybersecurity and 
CI/KR protection). How then can they be expected to do this for the cybersecurity 
discipline when the majority of CI/KR is developed, operated, and owned by the private 
and public sectors? Any proficient system administrator or CIO will say that they, the 
DHS, cannot. Without interconnected feeds to a situational awareness tool for analysis, 
such as a common operational picture, this preempts that ability. EINSTEIN may provide 
federal civilian information system indicators, and DoD may provide federal government 
information system indicators, but if readiness requires fusion with the private sector 
companies in charge of CI/KR, how then can the DHS provide timely and accurate 
assessment of the health of the nation’s cybersecurity? I submit, at the risk of appearing 
overly repetitive, that they cannot. More importantly, how can those responsible for 
assessing ongoing cyber-attacks and current malicious cyber activity accurately advise 
the U.S. president or NORTHCOM commander as to the current scope of the threat 
posed to the nation? Although effort and progress is being made by the DHS and like-
minded partners (e.g., NIST), the creation of a solution is still evolving. This creates a 
disparity between an unrealistic expectation of capability in maintaining situational 
awareness and the requirement for the NORTHCOM commander to be able to make 
informed assessments which could affect the national defensive posture. 
Understanding that significant legal liability impediments and a 
dearth of strict regulations preclude the proactive cyber-intelligence sharing by the 
private and public sectors, this creates a gap between desired outcome and regulatory 
required behavior. 
c. Authorities 
Previously highlighted, the authorities, aligned under the DHS as the lead 
for cybersecurity, are reactionary in nature and thus assume a response and recovery role 
post INS designation while failing to emphasize the usefulness of prevention, protection, 
and mitigation. This does not exactly translate into a deficiency, but rather into a matter 
of evolution. The DHS, to now achieve the stated national preparedness goal, requires 
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broader statutory authority to address the proactive aspect of domestic security, as 
repetitively mentioned earlier. 
Unexpectedly during my research, it was discovered that a high visibility 
cyber-related issue of national concern could possibly be mitigated by simple revision of 
existing wording in Title 6 of the U.S. Code. This revision would formally provide  the 
DHS with the necessary statutory authority to specifically take the lead on intellectual 
property theft being perpetrated through the cyber domain. Current law, created over a 
decade ago when the DHS was being established, states that the DHS will “… ensure that 
the overall economic security of the United States is not diminished by efforts, activities, 
and programs aimed at securing the homeland…” (6 U.S.C. §111, sect. 101, para. b.1.F). 
Through minor edits, this subparagraph could easily be modified in one of two ways: (1) 
that the DHS will “… ensure that the overall economic security of the United States is not 
diminished by [malicious] efforts, activities, and programs [initiated or controlled by 
aggressors utilizing the cyber domain] ….”; or (2) that the DHS will “… ensure that the 
overall economic security of the United States is not diminished by efforts, activities, and 
programs aimed at securing the homeland, [nor allow it to be diminished by malicious 
efforts, activities, and programs initiated or controlled by aggressors utilizing the cyber 
domain] ….” Not only would either of these proposed revisions cover dedicated efforts of 
major intellectual property theft, but either is broad enough to account for any future 
cyber-related threat to U.S. economic security. This is not to say that they pre-empt the 
DOJ in their federal law enforcement role, but it would clearly set the standard of 
providing the DHS with the statutory authority to specifically be looking for those crimes 
in order to alert the DOJ. As this is not solely for the protection of CI/KR, and would 
cause significant outcry from industry, I have refrained from including this in the 
recommendations given in the next chapter.  
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VI. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND  
FUTURE WORK 
Building from the analysis by which gaps were identified this chapter begins with 
my conclusions, proposes recommendations to close the gaps and concludes with 
recommendations for future work. 
A. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this thesis has examined the current and past literature involving 
CIP and emergency response by reviewing the various roles and authorities allocated to 
the major federal agencies. In summary of the analysis, the U.S. has experienced 
numerous strategy assessments, with respect to cybersecurity of the national CI/KR. This 
spiral is fixed in place primarily due to the continual realization that there exists a clear 
disparity between the strategic national requirements and DHS’ execution of their 
mandate regarding the protection of CI/KR and emergency management. To be more 
specific, the DHS is mandated to protect national CI/KR, but only given authority and 
responsibility to respond and recover to INS post occurrence. This incongruence between 
that stated strategic national goal and the needed prevention, protection and mitigation 
aspects of regulatory guidance and authorities is evident by the strategy assessment 
spiral. 
Although not necessarily palatable, the specific recommendations with respect to 
improving the cybersecurity of the national CI/KR, are to: 
 Update the U.S. National Policy on CI/KR Protection; 
 Update the U.S. National Cybersecurity Strategy; 
 Ensure the National Protection Framework Includes Clear and 
Deconflicted Roles and Responsibilities for Cybersecurity; 
 Expand/Revise DHS Authorities; 
 Revisit Cyber-attack Threshold Criteria Used in the SNRA; 
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 Standardize Lexicon; 
 Incentivize Private Sector Participation in a CI/KR COP; and 
 Provide Liability Protection for Private Sector Voluntary Information 
Sharing.  
Cyber-related threats are an ever-developing and increasing part of the nation’s 
vulnerability and the homeland security enterprise must be a part of this evolutionary 
solution or they will fail. This thesis is provided as a basic background of the authorities 
and responsibilities associated with CI/KR protection and their alignment with U.S. 
strategic intent. Common sense must eventually prevail; the question remains if it is to be 
through reason or through the experience granted over time. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Three key points not covered by this research must be conceded to move forward: 
(1) the U.S. maintains one of the most powerful militaries in the world; (2) globalization 
has interconnected many politically divergent economies; and (3) social networking has 
created communities beyond the national identity. These three points, when combined, 
lend themselves to highlight that the most likely threat to the U.S. is via an asymmetric 
vector where attribution is difficult and threat of escalation is low. One such asymmetric 
vector that aligns with these criteria is a cyber-attack. Whether conventional or 
asymmetric, any dedicated force with the means will attempt to reduce uncertainty and 
risk by conducting reconnaissance prior to initiating an attack. This specific premise is 
reinforced when the cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007 is reviewed. Therefore, cyber 
intrusions into U.S. systems, whether CI/KR or not, are likely to be significant indicators 
that can assist the U.S. government and, by extension, the DHS and DoD to assess 
aggressor intent. To break into aggressors’ operational and informational cycles earlier 
than after execution, the U.S. needs to address the following recommendations. 
1. Update the U.S. National Policy on CI/KR Protection 
The DoD teaches its officers that all efforts begin with, and are defined by, 
requirements. Why is it then that U.S. policy for critical infrastructure protection in U.S. 
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Code (42 U.S.C. 5195c, sect. c(1)) is still dated from 2001 and has yet to be updated to 
match the broader 2011 National Preparedness Goal two years after the fact?  
Update Title 42 to include the prevention, protection, and mitigation aspects of 
preparedness necessary to justify proactive critical infrastructure protection, in addition to 
the reactionary ones currently alluded to—response and recovery. 
2. Update the U.S. National Cybersecurity Strategy 
Much like the findings published in December 2008 and reiterated in their 2011 
report, the Commission on Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency highlight that a 
revision of the national cybersecurity strategy is immediately necessary (Securing 
Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency, 2008, p. 1; Cybersecurity Two Years Later; 2011,  
p. 5). As I have waded through significant volumes of policy, authority and 
miscellaneous departmental documents, I concur. Many executive agencies have 
published their individual cyber strategies, but I find it difficult to fathom how they are 
aligned, if not under a single current national cybersecurity strategy. In order to better 
align the common desired end-state, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (2003) 
needs to be updated.  
As such, the updated national cybersecurity strategy should be nested under the 
National Planning System. This document should be created through the updating and 
minor revision of three existing documents as templates—National Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace, Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, and PPD-8—with specific 
emphasis on three key issues: (1) utilization of a whole-of-nation approach; (2) 
addressing all five national preparedness mission areas; and (3) broadening of threat 
categories to be all-inclusive at a national level. Due to the desired nested nature of the 
national cybersecurity strategy as a strategic document, I recommend that both PPD-8 
and the National Planning System be preemptively updated to reflect their national focus, 
vice their current focus on the specific threats posed by terrorism and disasters. 
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a. PPD-8 and National Planning System 
PPD-8, and by default the National Planning System, set a significant 
precedence of a national preparedness standard by which national agencies could unify 
toward a common goal. The issue identified is that the National Preparedness Goal 
provided by PPD-8 focuses too narrowly on terrorism and disasters. They were clearly 
written by the DHS for DHS while posing as national level documents. This should have 
never been an acceptable answer to national preparedness and needs to be rectified to 
reflect President Obama’s stated intent. 
Additionally, while not seeking this conclusion in this research, incidental 
findings indicate that current national preparedness documents makes no allowance for 
espionage, industrial or otherwise, as they have too narrow of a focus. I submit that, when 
developed, a sound national cybersecurity strategy is a prerequisite to achieving 
preparedness. 
 This gap in strategic intent and practice has allowed for an unprecedented 
theft of U.S. intellectual property, which is clearly in the DOJ’s standing mandate to 
impede as a violation of federal law.  
3. Ensure the Pending National Protection Framework Includes Clear 
and Deconflicted Roles and Responsibilities for Cybersecurity 
Although the recommendation title is fairly clear, it should be noted that work has 
already been done on this front by OUSD-P Cyber, DHS, and DOJ through their 
interagency efforts to create the Bubble Chart (Figure 4). Failure to include this graphic 
in current or updated form, or more importantly a significant written explanation of the 
graphically depicted duties, would draw significant suspicion as to validity and actual 
cooperation and deconfliction between the executive agencies.  
4. Expand/Revise DHS Authorities 
The national CI/KR is a system of systems. This concept should not be lost on the 
reader. Cybersecurity, as a commercially lucrative discipline, has already been addressing 
this problem and I believe can be used to illuminate the way ahead.  
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When securing a system it is logical to start with the basics, which are local 
security measures, both physical and logical. As the system grows or security needs to be 
heightened, the logical progression is to install an IDS to detect known signatures or 
behaviors that put the system at risk. This is eventually followed by the upgrade to an 
IPS, which adds automatic system configuration responses to mitigate incoming rule-
based undesired traffic.  
The DHS is monitoring the executive agencies for anomalies at an improved IDS 
level, while apparently waiting for authorization to upgrade to the IPS functionality 
offered by E3A. Two routes present themselves, but the least effort would be to revisit 
statutory authorities in Title 44, with the failed Protecting Cyberspace as a National 
Asset Act of 2010 (Senate Report No. 111-368) as a template to increase justification of 
the E3A upgrade by the Network Security Deployment branch of the DHS NPPD. 
5. Revisit Cyber-attack Threshold Criteria Used in the SNRA 
Although addressed in the SNRA, identification of the cyber-attack threshold 
criteria is useful but precluded by: the difficulty in definitively calculating monetarily 
defined effects post cyber-attack, in order to assess the damage in relation to the 
significant thresholds to meet the national-level event criteria. To be honest, although I 
recommend revisiting this criterion for revision and clarification, I believe significant 
study and analysis should be done due to the seriousness and sensitivity of the topic. I 
therefore will include this as a topic for additional research in my future work section.  
6. Standardize Lexicon 
Clouding the issue of effective cybersecurity is the loose use of non-standardized 
terminology. The DoD has attempted to standardize its internal lexicon, but sometimes at 
the exclusion of terms already commonly used in private industry (e.g., cyber-attack as 
defined by CNSSI/NIST). Although the DoD does this to more clearly justify operations 
under authorities provided, it may perpetuate unintentional miscommunication. The claim 
that a military unit suffered a cyber-attack may mean something very different than if 
private-sector company issued the same claim. I propose that we start with standardizing 
two key terms—cyber-attack and whole-of-nation.  
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a. Cyber-attack 
Although the official definition of cyber-attack remains a matter of 
contention, the threshold of what constitutes an INS is not. The Strategic National Risk 
Assessment (2011) defines specific INS attack thresholds for cyber-attacks on both data 
and physical infrastructure in terms of thresholds for only integrity and availability. The 
term cyber-attack is not defined internal to the SNRA, but rather it is used in defining the 
INS attack thresholds. This may create uncertainty with respect to evaluating those 
explicitly stated INS thresholds, as the NIST definition also appears to include 
confidentiality. This is not to say that a confidentiality threshold was not considered when 
writing the SNRA, but logically may have been excluded intentionally in favor of 
maintaining the focus on the two aspects which directly affect proper operation of 
national CI/KR.  
This distinction, and consistent use of a standardized cyber-attack term, is 
important. To resolve the contention over the term cyber-attack requires that all federal 
agencies agree on whether it includes operations that compromise confidentiality; that is, 
whether a cyber-attack includes “… stealing controlled information” (Glossary of Key 
Information Security Terms, 2013, p. 57; Committee on National Security Systems 
Instruction 4009, 2010, p. 22). Specifically, clear delineation is important for the DHS, 
NORTHCOM commander and USCYBERCOM to justify an assessment that the nation 
is under attack, via the cyber domain, to the President.  
This clarification may prompt additional discussion as to whether theft of 
controlled information can ever reach a threshold to be considered an INS, thereby 
invoking a national response, or if it should be specifically discussed in future revision of 
the national cyber strategy. The scope of this recommendation, and factors for 
consideration, justifies careful consideration. As such, it has also been included in the 
future work section. 
b. Whole-of-Nation 
Cybersecurity of the national CI/KR is not solely a federal, state and local 
government issue. Why then do so many of the documents use the term whole-of-
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government or federal approach? All are examples of a unity of effort implementation, 
but these terms automatically discount the contributions required by the private and 
public sectors by creating the misperception that the government alone can provide the 
cybersecurity necessary to better safeguard the CI/KR sectors. As such, references should 
be reviewed for exclusive terminology and be replaced with inclusive terms, which more 
accurately encompass the focus on the national effort and contributions of the public and 
private sectors. I propose use of the term whole-of-nation. Just think, with 
implementation of the whole-of-nation (WoN) approach, we have already “WoN.”  
7. Incentivize Private Sector Participation in a CI/KR COP 
Regulatory mandate is often seen as the compulsory method to force private 
sector compliance with much needed reforms for the good of the nation. In fact, both 
reports from the Commission on Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency (2008 & 
2011) recommended that the federal government regulate cyberspace as a mandatory 
milestone to achieve acceptable levels of cybersecurity (Securing Cyberspace for the 44th 
Presidency, 2008, p. 2; Cybersecurity Two Years Later; 2011, p. 1). I submit that, 
although practical, a second approach may be more palatable and therefore should be 
better analyzed—incentivization. This proposes the carrot over the stick.  
Regulation of federal and state systems seems prudent, as presented in Title 44, 
but general regulatory changes for the private and public sector may not be necessary if 
sufficient incentives are provided to voluntarily participate. This solution seems 
preferable as the private-sector is already burdened with various compliance 
requirements, and is therefore unlikely to willingly assume others unless there is 
significant return on investment. That is not to say that the federal government should 
over regulate or assume the sole protection of national CI/KR. On the contrary, by 
creating a system by which a COP is voluntarily opted into through the automatic and 
encrypted feeds from the disparate private sectors responsible for CI/KR, additional 
regulation forcing the private and public sector participation may become unnecessary. 
This is in direct conflict with the report by the Commission on Securing Cyberspace for 
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the 44th Presidency as they state “… voluntary action is not enough” (Securing 
Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency, 2008, p. 2). 
In looking at this recommendation, it should be assumed that in the interest of 
profits, that private sector companies utilize some form of network protection and thus 
maintain a means of localized compiling and logging of anomalies. The U.S. government 
should then capitalize on their efforts and offer opted-in companies the expertise, if not 
hardware, necessary to connect the private security information and event management 
(SIEM) systems to the national CI/KR COP. This would defer cost to the federal 
government and ease any perceived burden on the private sector. Actual incentives for 
the program should be seriously considered, but could include free sharing of nationally 
collected threat signatures from the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services offered by DHS 
and/or a public association with the national effort to secure the U.S. CI/KR, thereby 
increasing public confidence in continuity of services. It is important that these incentives 
be logically significant enough to offset any reservations that public or private companies 
would have regarding the information sharing agreement. It would be remiss to not note 
that the companies may incur a significant challenge as privacy advocates would raise 
concerns about the additional sharing of data with the government. Their concerns carry 
more weight in light of the recent alleged NSA abuses as revealed through former 
employees, and as cries are heard to the effect that “…limiting government’s power is 
fundamental to the US political system” (Landau, 2013, p. 55). 
8. Provide Liability Protection for Private Sector Voluntary Information 
Sharing 
Current failure of U.S. law to adequately provide liability protection for private 
sector companies impedes the national efforts. This oversight precludes timely 
information being provided to the federal government, ideally through the NCCIC, in 
order to meet the goal stated in the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001. 
Although lexicon standardization has been an impediment to previous attempts to 
introduce legislation which would provide this (e.g., Critical Intelligence Sharing and 
Protection Act), scope of the bill should be narrowed, and reduction of ambiguity should 
be sought in providing a definition section, in order to expedite the passing of this crucial 
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piece of legislation. It should also be clear that the federal government is to receive 
processed cyber intelligence and indicators (e.g., externals) of communications and not 
raw U.S. person data (e.g., internals) unless required by U.S. law to an agency authorized 
to obtain such data, in accordance with existing laws. 
C. SUGGESTED FUTURE WORK/RESEARCH 
Due to the complex nature of the emerging and increasing vulnerability combined 
with the interdependencies in both technology and authorities, the topic of the protection 
of national CI/KR from cyber-threats is a broad field ripe for continued/future work.  
Primary suggestions for future research are: (1) comparison of the U.S. national 
roles and responsibilities with other western nations (e.g., United Kingdom, Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, Denmark, and Norway); (2) research into the inclusion or 
continued exclusion of confidentiality in the threshold definition of a cyber-attack; (3) the 
policy, legal (to include regulatory) and financial security issues that would need to be 
resolved to better integrate the private sector for a whole-of-nation response in CI/KR 
protection; (4) an analysis of the DIB perimeter, with a focus on DoD’s responsibility as 
the SSA; (5) privatization, with respect to the government’s ability to establish and 
maintain control of national security initiatives; and (6) the national strategic implications 
relative to the political and economic issues, both positive and negative, for military 
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